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ABSTRACT
The field of statutory interpretation is one of central importance to 
both lawyers and judges, perhaps even more central to their daily work than 
the analysis of appellate opinions.  As a field of academic inquiry, however, 
the field has become rather stagnant and seems now at a stalemate between 
contending schools of thought, with most siding against the pure forms of 
textualism sometimes associated with Justice Scalia and arguing for some 
form of contextualism.  What kinds of context should matter is disputed.  
Thus far, however, scholars have paid remarkably little attention to one 
crucial contextual factor:  What is the statute about?  What domain of 
human activity does the law seek to regulate?  Justice Scalia urges courts to 
attend to the plain language of a statute -- any statute -- in order to 
encourage legislators to clearly say what they mean.  This argument is easier 
to sustain in substantive areas where great precision is obtainable.  But 
should legislatures be barred from acting in substantive areas where 
precision in very difficult?   Legal scholars have acknowledged, then turned 
away from, this question.  This is so in part because scholarship in this area 
has not thus far taken account of advances in cognitive science and 
communications theory.  In this article I explain how the cognitive science 
of categorization, along with signal detection theory and complexity theory, 
allow us to compare substantive domains according to the degree of 
difficulty in legislating in them, by establishing a metric for the theorization
of a substantive domain.
The implications of this approach extend well beyond informing the 
process of drafting legislation.  The theoretical foundations of statutory 
interpretation depend on unspoken, and often incorrect, assumptions about 
the possibilities of precision in crafting statutes.   Once statutory 
interpretation is understood as an inevitably human process, relying on the 
tools of human cognition and categorization, the field of statutory 
interpretation itself might be reconstructed on a more solid, even scientific, 
foundation. 
3I. INTRODUCTION.
A. Law, Time and Category
Law exists in time.  The very notion of law is ex ante.   Law says what 
should, upon certain conditions, happen in the future.   Laws are generally 
applied ex post.  Certain things having now occurred, what consequence 
does law require?   These notions lie near the core of the concept of law, 3
and near the boundary between law and raw power.  In law we calculate 
consequence before identity, the rules before the game.4  If we want to write 
an election code that specifies whether a "dimpled chad" should be recorded 
as a vote, we recognize that such rules are best crafted before anyone can 
tell how they might affect a given election.  There are powerful 
philosophical arguments for why such arrangements are morally coherent.5
For now, we note that most statutes operate in futuro, taking the form, "In 
the event X should happen, Y should follow."6
There is controversy among scholars about what legislatures are doing 
when they enact statutes; indeed, the entire field of "legisprudence" is 
devoted to the subject. As an empirical matter, however, legisprudence 
scholarship is more concerned with what legislatures are doing than how
they are, or should be, doing it.7  Rather than engage these questions, I will 
adopt a view of legislation that is as commonplace in the world in which 
3 This is concededly but one, positivist notion of the meaning of law.  Law may also have 
expressivist and other functions, but in the real world of legislators, citizens, bureaucrats and 
judges, particular laws also have the more mundane positivist functions I ascribe here.
4 There are, of course, also laws that operate ex post: for example, reparations and amnesty 
laws. But a core notion of law itself, as opposed to particular statutes, is that it operates generally 
and in futuro.   These principles find expression in the prohibition against ex post facto laws and 
bills of attainder.  
5 This is the point of Rawls’ "veil of ignorance."  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 
136-42 (1971).
6 Democratic law thus departs from the democratic ideal in at least two respects.  We are all 
subject to laws made by necessarily imperfect representatives.   We are also all subject to laws 
made by people for whom we had no opportunity to vote for the simple reason that they were 
dead before we entered the world.  Although each new assembly might, in theory, wipe the statute 
books clean and begin anew, in every real democratic polity, people are governed by "the dead 
hand of the past."  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998).  Once again, the cognitive limitations of real people 
constrain the ideal:  no legislature comprised of human beings could actually reconsider the 
existing body of applicable law.
7 For a thoughtful, though now somewhat dated survey, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey,  Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in The Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 691(1987).  See also, ch. 6 in the Eskridge and Frickey casebook, WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, (2d ed. 1995).
4statutes are written as it is controversial in the world in which they are 
interpreted and critiqued.  I will assume that statutes are communicative 
acts of legislatures:  messages sent forward in time.
  Those messages have multiple audiences, including ordinary citizens, 
administrative agencies and judges.  Most scholarship about legislation and 
interpretation focuses on the judicial audience.8   But plainly the fact that 
law must speak to ordinary citizens introduces an additional set of 
constraints, some of them deeply rooted in constitutional principle.   For 
example, although a criminal statute may speak with sufficient precision to 
specialists and judges, it may nonetheless be declared "void for vagueness" 
as giving insufficient guidance to "ordinary people."9    Although I will 
attend in due course to the constraints introduced by the fact of the 
multiple audiences for law, I will focus primarily on legislation as 
communication between legislators and judges.   As an empirical matter, it 
may well be that vagueness or ambiguity in statutory language is the 
intended result rather than a problem, as Joseph Grundfest and A.C. 
Pritchard have argued. 10 No doubt this is sometimes the case.  For 
purposes of this article, however, I will assume that on occasion legislatures 
attempt to say what they mean with as much precision as possible, 
intending there to be as little variance as possible in how a statute will be 
interpreted by judges. 
One way to think about law-as-communication11 is to invoke as an 
alternative a new form of political junket: time travel.  If, rather than 
8 A notable exception is Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989), emphasizing the degree to which modern statutes are intended 
to speak to administrators rather than ordinary citizens or judges. , 
9 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
10 Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:  
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627.  
Grundfest and Pritchard demonstrate convincingly that Congress achieved almost perfect 
ambiguity with one statute, as evidenced by the essentially random manner in which the statute 
was interpreted.  Whether intended ambiguity of the sort documented by Grundfest and Pritchard 
is common is, of course, an empirical question I do not answer here.   
11 I hesitate to use this phrase because it has been adopted by scholars working in the 
traditions of the humanities who use "law" to refer to all talk and writing about legal subjects but 
who, strangely in my view, virtually ignore the talk and the writing of legislators that matters to 
both lawyers and citizens:  the writing of statutes that carry the force of state power.  For example, 
none of the scholarship collected in LAW AS COMMUNICATION (David Nelken ed., 1996) 
mentions legislators as participants in the communication of, and about, law.   I do not discount 
this enterprise but merely distinguish it.  My concerns run to the pragmatic and empirical, in 
contrast to those highlighted by Nelken in introducing that collection, including:  "Can law 
communicate? Should our definition of legal communication include all communications which 
refer to law (as Luhmann's does)?  Can we communicate with law?  Does our thinking about law 
assume the presence of authority and 'mind'".  Id. at 15.   I have overcome my hesitation in 
adopting the phrase because I believe my own use of the term coheres rather better with the way 
5passing statutes at time T1, legislators could simply project 
themselves, as needed, into the future at time T2, and there decide cases 
according to their T1 preferences, all problems of both legislation and 
statutory interpretation would disappear. No communication would be 
required because legislative preferences would be carried forward in time, in 
the heads of the time-traveling legislators. No "imaginative reconstruction" 
of legislative intent of the sort advocated by Judge Learned Hand would be 
necessary. 12
 In the meantime, legislatures can only pass statutes, which are plagued 
by problems of at least three kinds:  (1) those problems that attend all 
communication, including ambiguity, vagueness, noise, and risks of 
accidental misinterpretation; (2) special problems that attend 
communication in a changing environment about a changing subject 
matter; and (3) special problems of motivated misinterpretation that exist 
when those receiving the communication include those with interests that 
are differentially affected by particular decodings of a given message. 
Legal scholarship has attended primarily to the last two problems. Like 
other forms of communication, statutes encode intention and meaning.  
Statutory interpretation entails decoding.13  Theories of statutory 
interpretation engage the question of how we, especially the judges among 
us, ought to decode the meaning of statutes. To be sure, there are objections
to law-as-communication.  Legislatures are not single-minded entities and 
can be said to "intend" or "mean" anything only if we loosen the normal 
usage of those terms, prototypically applied to the utterances of 
individuals.14  Nor do many believe that judges are engaged only in a 
purely technical exercise of decoding the meanings of statutes, acting as the 
"honest agents" of legislatures.   These social facts are decried by some and 
celebrated by others, who embrace the notion of the judge as "a partner 
in which "communication" is most commonly understood, which may or not be its "plain 
meaning"
12 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914) (L. Hand, J.), cert. 
denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915).  As described by William Eskridge, "Through this imaginative 
process, the Court seeks to "reconstruct"' the answer the enacting Congress would have given if the 
interpretive issue had been posed directly."  William Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. 
REV 621, 630 (1990).
13  Richard Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and 
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987) (analogizing interpretation to a soldier's 
effort to understand a military order under battlefield conditions when communications have 
broken down]). For a summary of other examples of law-as-communication, see Anthony 
D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561 
(1989). See also, Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV.
585 (1996), for a history of the notion of courts as "honest agents" of legislatures.  
14 This criticism, perhaps by now a commonplace, was cogently made in 1930 by Max Radin, 
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871-72 (1930).
6[with the legislative branch] continuing to develop, in what he believes is 
the best way, the statutory scheme. .  . ".15
The objections to the notion of law-as-communication do not extend 
with equal force to every statute and interpretive problem.  In the case of a 
simple statute about a clearly and commonly understood subject, written in 
plain language, passed recently by a legislature with an announced and 
plainly evident intention -- call it an ideal statute -- the interpretations of 
lawyers, judges and scholars of virtually every interpretive philosophy will 
converge. In interpreting the ideal statute, we are all originalists, 
intentionalists, and textualists, drawn to giving expression to the plain 
meaning of a statute as the drafters originally intended it. Our 
commitments fade at varying rates with the passage of time and the 
changing of circumstance, but at the core our normative commitments run 
to plain meaning.
The real problem, of course, is that many real statutes depart from the 
ideal: meaning is rarely plain.  Leaving aside politics and values (which we 
exclude to the degree possible in the ideal case), both legislation and 
interpretation entail solving, with varying success, unavoidable problems of 
complexity and of communication.   With Cardozo, we can imagine an 
ideal code:  ". . . a code at once so flexible and minute, as to supply in 
advance for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule," but also 
recognize, with Cardozo, that ". . . life is too complex to  bring the 
attainment of this ideal within the compass of human powers."16
Two related kinds of obstacles stand between a legislature and 
Cardozo's ideal code: problems of understanding and problems of 
communication.  First, in order to "supply in advance for every conceivable 
situation" a rule, the domain of the statute's operation must be such that 
the range of "conceivable situations" is understood.  A legislature can 
establish official holidays without difficulty because of the predictable 
regularities of celestial mechanics that underlie calendars. A judge can 
determine with some certainty whether tomorrow is Christmas and the 
courtroom should be dark.  We have exceedingly precise means for 
specifying time, down to the heartbeat of an atom of cesium.  In much of 
life, however, especially in matters of human affairs, we understand far more 
than we can say in words.  We have no equivalently precise measure of the 
malice in the heart of a scoundrel, but the fact of that malice and its 
consequences are certainly more real to human beings than the 
mathematically described resonance of any atom.  In acting in domains like 
15 Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 313 (1986)
16Benjamin Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (1921)
7these  -- the overwhelming majority of areas that concern us  -- a 
legislature has nothing with which to work but words.
Perhaps the most important function of words in legislation is 
categorization:  of objects, events, situations and relationships.  There are 
various  ways of categorizing statutes in terms of how statutes themselves 
categorize.   Thus, legal scholars conventionally distinguish between 
statutes that specify rules and those that describe standards. Other scholars 
supply supplemental or alternative categorizations, for example: 
presumptions, factors, guidelines, and principles.17 The conventional 
examples are two forms of speed limit: a "rule" specifying a maximum speed 
limit of 55 miles per hour, or a "standard" prohibiting "excessive speed."18
One aspect of the distinction is the " . . . extent to which efforts to give 
content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act."19  But as 
the example makes clear, both rules and standards must be understood as 
specifying categories, both at the time citizens make decisions and at the 
time those decisions are assessed by the legal system.  A driver seeking to 
drive slower than 55 miles per hour can rely on a categorical boundary 
provided by the indicator on her speedometer; the legal system can rely on 
the instrumentation of the radar or laser.  A driver seeking to avoid 
excessive speed has a much more difficult task in determining the boundary 
between reasonable and excessive speed -- as does a judge or juror 
evaluating his behavior later.  However one categorizes statutes, it is worth 
noting that virtually every statute categorizes and fixes boundaries that 
separate: speeding from lawful driving; murder from manslaughter, and so 
on.
 It could scarcely be otherwise.  If law is about things that matter to 
people, it must necessarily be about categories.  Human beings (and other 
sentient creatures) survive in a chaotic, unpredictable and poorly 
understood world through categorization. Unmediated by categories, the 
world confronts us, in William James' memorable description of the infant's 
world, as "a blooming, buzzing confusion."20   Evolution has enabled us to 
notice that the large animal of long teeth and tail approaching quietly at 
dusk resembles the animal that ate our cousin yesterday.  While our dog 
may also categorize the same large cat, only humans (and to some degree, 
chimpanzees) are able to recognize higher order categories that depend on 
17 Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
18 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 
(1992); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 964-65.
19 Kaplow, supra note 15, at 560.
20  William James, The Principles of Psychology, 1890, ch. 13, reprinted in 53 Great Books 
of the Western World 318 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952).
8relations between other categories -- such as "cousins."21 In the absence of 
law of some kind, relations among the people in large populations or
complex societies will also approach the state of James' "blooming, buzzing 
confusion, "even if Hobbes was a bit pessimistic.  Felt social norms and 
instinct will only carry us so far.22  And even norms require some 
appreciation for category.  Neighbors may come to an understanding about 
how to deal with wandering livestock,23 but they will need to agree on
what constitutes "livestock."  And law, whether in the form of imperial 
decree or modern statute, must communicate about categories. 
Statutes take the logical form: "If X, Y is the consequence."   Statutory 
interpretation (again, in our idealized world) means determining whether 
some configuration of events or objects comes within the meaning of X.   
To cite perhaps the most famous example, is a law prohibiting "vehicles in 
the park" violated when veterans put an antique tank on display, or a child 
rides a bicycle through the playground?24   A part of the answer lies in the 
category label "vehicle" and how one should decode its meaning.
A judge trying to decide whether the tank or bicycle is a vehicle will 
not want for advice on how to proceed.  No fewer than 69 law review 
articles take note of the problem.25 The general literature on statutory and 
constitutional interpretation is vast and growing.  Battles rage in both 
appellate opinions and the law journals. Philosophical worlds collide:  
textualists against purposivists and both against dynamicists; hermeneutics 
against pragmatism, postmoderns against positivists.26
Linguistics and a small "law and language" scholarly movement have 
brought some overdue clarity to these conversations.   Larry Solan and 
Peter Tiersma have used linguistic theory effectively to reframe our 
understanding of interpretation.27    In a series of important articles, 
21 Recent research indicates that chimpanzees (but not monkeys) can learn categories that 
depend on relations among other categories.  Roger K.R. Thompson & David L. Oden, 
Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological 
Monkey and the Analogical Ape, 24 COGNITIVE SCI. 363 (2000).
22 And even norms can operate only on the basis of some common understanding of 
categories.  For example, in order for neighboring ranchers to develop norms for dealing with 
wandering cattle, they must first have a common sense of what constitutes a cow (or heifer, steer 
or bull).  Is the goat eating the laundry on the line subject to understood rules about cattle?
23 Robert Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991).
24  H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
607 (1958). 
25WESTLAW search on JLR file, March 6, 2004.
27 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits:  The Decline of Textualism in 
Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235 (1997) Peter M. Tiersma, A Message In A Bottle: Text, 
Autonomyn and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431 (2001)
9Steven Winter has brought to law, especially constitutional law, the 
cognitive linguistics of George Lakoff.28   A 1995 conference on law and 
linguistics at Washington University produced an impressive series of 
articles demonstrating the utility of applying linguistic theory to a wide 
range of important problems in law in general and statutory interpretation 
in particular.29
Law and language scholarship has not sought to establish a new 
interpretivist theory, but rather to bring to jurisprudence what science 
knows about language and communication. Professor Eskridge is among the 
rare practitioners of the mainstream jurisprudence of interpretation to make 
use of the results of scientific linguistics.30  But in my view, no thoughtful 
person -- of any potential interpretivist persuasion -- can ignore this body of 
work.  So long as the real world of law involves human beings,  any useful 
theory of interpretation must take account the actual use of language. 
At the same time, it is worth noting the ways in which law and 
language scholarship is incomplete. First, like the scholarship on 
interpretation generally, law-and- language scholarship has focused almost 
exclusively on the problem of extracting meaning from a given legal text, 
rather than the related but not entirely identical problems of putting 
meaning into text.  Generally speaking, as Robert Seidman has written, 
The focus of American legal scholarship has failed to follow the 
shift from appellate decisions to legislation as the principal source 
28. Steven L. Winter, Book Survey: Minding the Law, By Anthony G. Amsterdam and 
Jerome Bruner, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1607 (2001); Steven L. Winter, The" Power” Thing, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 721 (1996); Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J.L. & 
HUMANITES 233 (1994); Steven L. Winter, The Constitution of Conscience, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1805 (1994); Steven L. Winter, One Size Fits All, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1857 (1994);  Steven L.
Winter, Confident, But Still Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REV. 893 (1993); Steven L. Winter, 
Fast Food and False Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 965 (1992); 
Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992);  
Steven L. Winter, For What It’s Worth, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789 (1992);  Steven L. Winter, 
Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (1991); Steven L. Winter, An 
Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991); Steven 
L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (1991); 
Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommesurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1441 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 
(1990); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and 
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental 
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 
(1988); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
29 Conference, What is Meaning in a Legal Text? Northwestern University/Washington 
University Law & Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 769 (1995) et seq.
30 Eskridge and Frickey, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 5, at 
642. 
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of law. We have no theory of legislation to aid in the generation of 
ideas to guide the legislative process, "no general account of how 
such statutes should be designed, and what makes them effective or 
ineffective, desirable or undesirable."31
While there are now a handful of counterexamples to Seidman's general 
proposition,  Frederick Bower's Linguistic Aspects of Legislative Expression
still stands virtually alone in applying even moderately sophisticated 
theoretical tools (standard linguistics theory) to the problem of the crafting 
of statutes.  
Partly because of emphasis on problems of interpretation, the 
penetration of the science of linguistics into law has been incomplete.   
Although linguistics is one of the disciplines that gave rise to cognitive 
science, linguistics itself has taken limited account of the more recent 
theoretical and empirical work of cognitive science.  Most of the science in 
law and language scholarship is for that reason rather dated.32  Bower's 
book relies on conceptions of categorization in linguistics that date to the 
early 1970's.33  Steven Winter's work makes effective use of Lakoff's 
cognitive linguistics, including Lakoff's theory of idealized cognitive 
models, but Lakoff's theories have not themselves fared very well within 
cognitive science.34
31 Robert B. Seidman, Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist Approach to the 
Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 
(1992).
32 Larry Solan, particularly in his use of the mental models theory of Philip Johnson-Laird, is 
a notable exception.  Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003); Lawrence M. Solan, Introduction, A Conference in Celebration 
of the Publication of Steven L. Winter’s Book, A Clearing in the Forest, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 941 
(2002); Lawrence M. Solan, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability, 64-AUT LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001); Susan M. Herman & Lawrence M. Solan, The Jury in the 
Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 971 (2001); Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work 
Pretty Well, But Not Great: Words and Rules in Legal Interpretation, 26 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 243 (2001); Lawrence M. Solan, Convicting the Innocent Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 465 (2001); Lawerence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof 
in Criminal Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1999); Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1998).
33 Frederick Bowers, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE EXPRESSION 138-42
(1989) 
34 A very rough sense of the relative success of Lakoff's "idealized cognitive models" (ICM) 
theory can be derived from a quick exercise in bibliometry.  In all the psychology journals on the 
PsycINFO database, only 7 mention the ICM theory in either the title or abstract -- compared to 
5289 articles referencing "categorization." (search conducted June 2, 2003) .  In comparison, 55 
law review articles in the JLR database on WESTLAW mention Lakoff's theory.  Of these, 9 were 
written by the prolific Steven Winter, and many of the remainder cite Winter citing Lakoff.   
These are not directly comparable numbers in that WESTLAW contains all citations, while 
PsycINFO is limited to titles and abstracts.  Some of the reasons Lakoff's theory of idealized 
cognitive models has not fared well in psychology and cognitive science are set out in John 
11
 In sum, the law journals are virtually devoid of discussion of 
the problems entailed in the creation of  the primary texts of law. In 
comparison to the theoretical riches available to judges and scholars 
concerned with interpretation, the legislator or lawyer looking for guidance 
in crafting a statute will find only a handful of articles of comparable
sophistication.35  For whatever reasons,36 the vast bulk of sophisticated 
scholarship about statutory law has been scholarship about interpretation of 
an existing rather than a potential or intended text.
This essay comes at the problem of law and interpretation the other 
way around -- from the "sending" or encoding end of law-as-
communication.   Legislation is, of course, not the only form in which law is 
communicated.  Law is also made by appellate judges, whose opinions also 
speak to multiple future audiences.  I restrict the focus of this essay, 
however, to the problems of communicating law in statutory form, with 
Vervaeke & Christopher D. Green, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Theories:  A Critique of Lakoff's 
Theory of Categorization, 12 METAPHOR & SYMBOL 59 (1997).  Lakoff's elegant and 
evocative work on metaphor has found a broader audience, though less so among cognitive 
scientists.  This is not to say that Lakoff is wrong.  Indeed, I find his work superior to much of the 
more conventional cognitive science scholarship in his attention to narrative.   He and Jerome 
Bruner have kept alive a rigorous science-based focus on narrative while much of cognitive 
science has ignored it. 
35 Seidman's essay surely counts as a significant counter example.  Other works reflecting 
significant sophistication in linguistics, philosophy or cognitive theory include foundationally 
important work by Reed Dickerson, including REED DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING
(1977) and THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1986) (notably, ch. 3:  Drafting 
and Communication); aspects of William Eskridge's work on interpretation, especially William  
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1103 (1995); FREDERICK BOWERS, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE 
EXPRESSION (1989).  Works with narrower focus that make a significant general contribution 
include Julian B. Mcdonnell, Definition and Dialogue in Commercial  Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
623 (1995) and Steven L.  Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking 
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 (1995).  In using the word "sophisticated," I 
do not mean to degrade the many works that aim to give practical guidance to the drafters of 
statutes, guidance in the form of "words to avoid," "how to express time," and so on.  See, e.g., G. 
C. THORNTON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, (4th ed. 1996).  I also exclude work by scholars 
of obvious sophistication  in linguistics and other fields whose work has other aims, including 
improving the language often used by lawyers and judges by encouraging the avoidance of
"legalese."  See, e.g.  PETER TIERSMA,  LEGAL LANGUAGE (1999).
36 Professor Seidman offers several hypotheses and suggests research on why scholarship has 
to so large a degree ignored the problem of legislation.  Seidman, supra note 28.  I would add:    
Like judges and most lawyers, law professors are generally concerned with the laws that are, rather 
than those that might be.  Many have been clerks to judges, for whom statutory interpretation is 
part of the job description;  relative few have labored in legislative vineyards.  To the degree that 
most law professors envision an audience beyond the academy,  they are probably more likely  to 
think of judges than of legislators -- apart from pieces on policy  or legal reform most likely to 
come from the legislative branch.   Finally, statutory interpretation has evolved from 
constitutional interpretation, still regarded as the reputational apex of the academic intellectual 
enterprise.   
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particular reference to the problem of specifying categories in legislation.    I 
aim to demonstrate the utility of applying recent work in cognitive science 
and decision theory to the problems of categorizing in legislation.37
Perhaps the primary benefit of a sustained focus on the problems of 
encoding of statutory text and a scientific look at the central problem of 
categorization is the light thereby cast on some current controversies in 
interpretive theory.  The scholarship about what judges should do when 
they receive these messages is voluminous and varied.  Formalists and 
textualists argue that judges should pay as little attention as possible to 
anything other than the words of the statute.  There are perhaps a dozen
species of theory of statutory interpretation that would have judges take 
account of both text and context.  Although these theories differ 
substantially in the details, all are antiformalist and, in one way or another, 
contextualist theories.  Contextualists differ both about how much 
attention judges should pay to context and which contexts should matter.  
Even committed textualists will concede that sometimes context is essential 
to extract meaning from words, as in deciding whether a statute about 
"banks" refers to rivers or financial institutions.  Others would extend 
conventional linguistic concepts to bring within the scope of relevant 
context the particular "interpretive communities" who make sense of 
statutory language.38  Intentionalists would have judges pay particularly 
close attention to the circumstances and the legislative process that 
produced a statute.   Others, notably William Eskridge, would have judges 
interpret statutes "dynamically, in light of their present societal, political 
and legal context."39  Pragmatists like Richard Posner would have judges 
attend to the economic and other effects of interpreting statutes in ways 
that violate "well founded expectations."40  Thus, all interpretive theories 
beyond the purest form of textualism advocate interpretation that takes 
account of a range of types of contexts, either at the time of statutory 
enactment, the time of interpretation, or both.   Some scholars have 
abandoned the quest for a universal theory of interpretation, arguing 
instead for a contextualized choice of interpretive approaches.  For 
37 As will also become clear, I have not brought to bear all the possible theoretical paradigms 
originating in the humanities that one might deploy toward explicating the metaphor of law as 
communication, including especially the work of Habermas.  The collection edited by Nelken, 
supra note 8, is a useful introduction to these perspectives.
38 William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element In Statutory
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629 (2001).
39 WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 1479 (1994). 
40 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:  
NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW AND CULTURE 238, 235-53 (Morris 
Dickstein ed., 1998).
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example, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule would reframe the 
question of interpretation as "how should certain institutions, with their 
distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret certain texts’"41, thus 
attending to the context of interpretation itself.
Scholars are thus open to considering many kinds of contexts in 
statutory interpretation.  But there are aspects of context rather remarkably 
absent from this scholarship:  First, what is the legislation about?  That is, 
what is the domain of human activity the statute seeks to regulate?   
Second, how well is this substantive domain of legislation understood, 
either by lay people or by science and experts?  Put another way, how might
a legislature have been more precise had it chosen to do so?  In every case 
the "context" to which contextualist scholars of various species refer is not 
the substantive domain in which law operates, but the historical, social, 
and/or legal contexts in which law is created and interpreted.42  Although 
scholars use examples drawn from varied domains to illustrate their points, 
no conscious awareness of the consequences of the choice of illustration is 
revealed.  Statutes about slum housing, pornography, assault weapons, 
agricultural subsidies, or tax shelters might be subjected to different 
interpretive strategies depending on institutional or other contexts, but no 
scholar has argued that the choice of interpretive strategy should also 
depend on how well the subject matter of the legislation is understood or 
theorized, either scientifically or in the general culture, either at the time of 
enactment or of interpretation.   
I make precisely that argument in this article.  I propose and explain 
why one might simultaneously share with Justice Scalia an aversion to talk 
about legislative intent in interpreting statutes about deadlines for filing 
claims and embrace Professor Eskridge's theory of "dynamic statutory 
interpretation" when it comes to laws seeking to regulate the production of 
assault weapons.  I argue here that any sound interpretive theory may 
attend to some of the variables of context that have concerned other 
scholars, but must also attend to the state of knowledge about the realm of 
human affairs in which law operates.  As I explain, recent developments in 
41 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV.  885, 886 (2003).
42 For example, Jonathan R. Siegel explains that "Contextualism in administrative law is the 
interpretation of administrative law statutes in light of background principles of administrative 
law.” Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (1998).  
Others use the term to refer to interpretation that examines the “plain meaning of the statute's 
language in conjunction with the historic evolution of the statute, along with any other legislative 
documents that may have accompanied the legislation. . . .According to contextualists, the 
language of statutes is often ambiguous” and “[a] statute's meaning often depends on its context 
and purpose,” Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult To Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a 
Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA,  52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1131 (2000).  
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cognitive science, decision theory, and other disciplines provide some 
reasonable means for determining when a primarily textualist or 
intentionalist (or other contextualist) method is more appropriate to the 
task of interpreting statutory law, consistent with core democratic 
principles.    A key factor in understanding the substantive context of 
legislation is how well the relevant domains of human knowledge have 
been theorized. 
Consider, for example, two social security disability rules specifying the 
category of persons with what is now called Down syndrome.  When my 
late brother Ricky, who adopted the name "Coach," was born in 1951, the 
syndrome was understood much as it had been understood when first 
labeled in 1866.  Eight years later, in 1959, science determined that the 
syndrome was the result of an extra chromosome.  Before 1959, the category 
could only be described by a fairly lengthy set of criteria or rules for 
specifying the category, or perhaps by reference to exemplar individuals or a 
prototype. After 1959, the category could be described very precisely: 
persons with additional chromosome 21, like Coach, have Down syndrome.  
Of course, a modern legislature might still decide to draft statutes using pre-
1959 understandings of Down syndrome.  But a modern court should take 
account of whether the enacting body had other choices, given the state of 
human knowledge at the time of the legislation.
This focus on the state of human knowledge about the objects of law 
also provides some insights into fundamental limits of law-as-
communication, and thus of law itself.  Just as Claude Shannon 
demonstrated that the flow of any kind of information was limited by the 
bandwidth of the transmission line,43 I will explore here whether law is 
also subject to fundamental  limits,  imposed not by any analogous 
"bandwidth" of history,  but by limitations on capacities for understanding 
in the fields in which law seeks to act.  I will suggest that these limits vary 
according to how adequately the subjects of legislation have been theorized 
outside of law -- in science or in the general culture.  The same approach 
that makes it possible to speak about theorization in a reasonably rigorous 
way, also suggests a metric for the intrinsic difficulty of legislating in a given 
substantive area, and thus the means to think rigorously about not only the 
pragmatics of creating law, but also of  its ultimate limits.
43 Shannon's law describes the theoretical maximum rate at which error-free digits can be 
transmitted over a bandwidth-limited channel in the presence of noise, usually expressed in the 
form C = W log2(1 + S /N ), where C is the channel capacity in bits per second, W is the 
bandwidth in hertz, and S /N is the signal-to-noise ratio.   C.E. Shannon & W. Weaver, THE 
MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1963) 
15
Finally, rather more modestly and pragmatically, we might 
actually learn something useful about the communicative choices of 
legislatures, and the various costs of  pursuing one or another.  Clearly, no 
legislature can actually draft a law in any but the most trivial substantive 
areas that will obviate the need for interpretation and an interpretive 
theory.  And I realize that sometimes vagueness is the intended 
consequence; in which case I hope to assist future legislatures in better 
calibrating their intended vagueness.  But I also make a pragmatist's leap of 
faith, assuming that fairly often legislatures want to say what they mean, 
and also assuming that drafting statutes is a task of varying difficulty, one 
that can be done in better and worse ways under given circumstances.  I 
also assume along the way that the progress made in the past two decades in 
understanding the nature and limits of human communication and 
cognition more generally may have some relevance to the communication 
and cognition of legislators and judges.
B. "Lawyers, Guns and Money," Pornography and Heat.
I will use as a continuing example a legislative category of "assault 
weapons," the specification of which has occupied a good deal of energy of 
both legislatures and courts, because of an especially volatile mix of 
"lawyers, guns and money."44    The category of assault  weapons usefully 
brings into sharp focus a fundamental problem of legislation: the world is 
always changing, such that those interpreting our words must apply them to 
44 "Lawyers, guns and money" are plausibly members of one of two categories.  In the original  
phrase in the late Warren Zevon's 1978 song, the category might be "things to send adventurers in 
distress":
I was gambling in Havana
I took a little risk
Send lawyers, guns and money
Dad, get me out of this. 
 [Warren Zevon, Lawyers, Guns, and Money, on Excitable Boy, (Asylum Records 1978)]
Readers can listen to the song at http://morris2k.cti.depaul.edu/zevon/newindex.html (visited 
2/16/04).
A cynic might propose the same as members of the category of "ingredients of bitter and 
irrational legislative battles”.
 I am indebted to Professor Peter Tiersma for allowing me to borrow from him the 
contextual reference to Warren Zevon's song.  Professor Tiersma and I found ourselves on the 
same panel at an academic meeting presenting papers utilizing the assault weapons example to 
illuminate why it is difficult to write laws.  Peter Tiersma, Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, 
and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV. 431 (2001) utilizes the same California statute to 
explore some related issues in statutory interpretation. 
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a world different than that in which they were uttered.  The problem is 
especially acute in the case of assault weapons because arms manufacturers 
have actively sought to evade the category, continually modifying weapons 
to evade the statutory classification.  This is a not uncommon 
phenomenon:  attempted restrictions on "tax shelters" produced enormous, 
categorically evasive creativity by lawyers.45  And the more general 
problem of how to sort millions of objects or situations into a finite number 
of categories, is universal to legislation.  Before turning to "assault weapons" 
in earnest, it may be useful to calibrate the difficulty of our sample problem 
by comparing it to two other problems that lie along the spectrum of 
difficulty. 
1.  Heat.
Suppose a legislature wants to require that landlords provide adequate 
heating in apartments within the jurisdiction.   A sloppy draftsman -- or 
one happy to evade the problem -- might simply use words like "adequate 
heat,"  leaving the determination of what those words might mean to future 
landlords, tenants, lawyers, bureaucrats and judges.  A more precise 
definition might reference, for example, "heating facilities capable of 
maintaining a minimum room temperature of 70 degrees F at a point three 
feet above the center of the floor in all occupied rooms”46  Such a law 
presents fairly minimal  problems in statutory interpretation.  To be sure, no 
thermometer or yardstick is absolutely precise, and there may be odd-shaped 
rooms in which determining  "the center" would  be a geometrician's 
challenge.   A bit more trouble is presented by the term "occupied room,"  
because the context begins to move  away from physics  and toward the 
complexities  of human behavior.  In general, however, classifying 
situations that violate the law from those that do not seems a fairly easy 
task.  A legislature  passing such a law in 1920, sending this message toward 
future judges, can be reasonably confident that it can be interpreted with 
little difficulty.47
45 Noel B. Cuningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters," 24 VA Tax Rev. 
(forthcoming, 2004).
46 This definition is identical with that in the California Code of Regulations, CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 25, § 34, save for the requirement that the measurement be taken at the "center" of the 
room.
47 Perhaps the most ambitious effort ever undertaken to communicate with precision with 
future readers was the record placed on the Starship Voyager, in the expectation that beings might 
try to make sense of it some millions of years in the future.   The content of this record  is 
described on the NASA website at http://vraptor.jpl.nasa.gov/voyager/record.html.
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2. Pornography
Near the other end of the spectrum lies a notoriously difficult problem: 
how to define "pornography."   Like Justice Stewart, we may believe that we 
"know it when we see it."48   But no one has been able to specify this 
category with very satisfactory precision.  The only reliable method of 
operationalizing Justice Stewart's definition would be to employ Justice 
Stewart to let us know what he sees, or to find a way to embed Justice 
Stewart’s sensibilities in some form of device or computer program.   Yet 
many people believe that we should not abandon the task of dealing with 
pornography because of the inevitable interpretive challenges.  In the case 
of pornography, as in many other difficult cases, the courts have explicitly 
delegated the problem of specifying categorical  boundaries to someone else, 
including future courts, taking account of then "contemporary community 
standards."49   Such a move avoids or delays the problem of categorization, 
but it does not suggest an answer to the core technical  problem:    How can 
a legislature best explain to future Courts, or to future juries applying 
contemporary community standards, what it means by the term 
"pornography"?
3. Assault weapons, briefly
On first impressions, then, the category of "assault weapons" lies 
usefully somewhere in the middle of the range of difficulty in  problems of 
categorization. The degree of difficulty is contextual.  There are thousands 
of kinds of weapons.  Some ways in which they can be categorized, (for 
example, as between rifles and shotguns), have been used for hundreds of 
years and pose few problems.50  But the category of "assault weapons" is not 
one that has been used outside efforts to regulate certain firearms and is one 
that has no clearly agreed meaning.  Moreover, even if a legislature could 
produce an exhaustive list by manufacturer and model number of banned 
48 The phrase is most commonly attributed to Justice Potter Stewart's concurrence in 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  According to Paul 
Gewirtz, who has devoted an entire law review article to the origins and use of the phrase, this is 
"one of the most famous phrases in the entire history of Supreme Court opinions".  Paul Gewirtz, 
On “I Know It When I See It”, 105 YALE L. J.  1023 (1996).
44 Part of the constitutional test for whether material is pornographic is "whether to the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
50 Rifles fire a single projectile, which spins as it leaves the barrel of the gun because of 
spiral-cut grooves inside the barrel.  Shotguns are normally used to fire many projectiles ("shot") 
at the same time, and hence have a smooth bore.
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weapons, those efforts would be ineffective in dealing with new weapons, 
some of them created specifically to get around the legal ban.  Much as 
bacteria mutate to avoid particular antigens, gun manufacturers can alter 
both the names and minor features of their products to keep them legal.   
For example, one of the weapons used by the killers in the Littleton, 
Colorado Columbine High School massacre in 1999 was a version of the 
TEC-9 machine pistol known as the "AB-10", modified specifically to 
evade federal firearms restrictions.  The "AB" in the designation referred to 
“after ban.”51
At least on first impressions, we ought to have a far easier time 
specifying "assault weapons" than "pornography."  On the other hand, the 
diversity of weapons and the existence of agents in the market actively 
seeking to evade categorization complexify the problem.  Thus, it appears 
that the legislative category of "assault weapons" may prove a suitable test 
case for explicating and evaluating the theoretical points I wish to make.
II. ELABORATING THE TEST CASE:  ASSAULT WEAPONS IN 
CALIFORNIA
The problem of specifying "assault weapons" has probably received the 
most intense legislative and judicial attention in California.  Perhaps the 
best way of approaching the problem of categorization is to consider the 
categorizing problem as it was perceived by the California legislature in 
1989.   
The opinion of the California Supreme Court in  Kasler v. Lockyear 
describes the precipitating event, a shooting on the playground of a 
Stockton, California, elementary school: 
While 300 pupils, mostly kindergartners through third graders, were 
enjoying their lunchtime recess, Patrick Purdy, who had placed 
plugs in his ears to dull the sounds of what he was about to do, 
drove up to the rear of the school and stepped out of his car 
carrying a Chinese-made semiautomatic AK-47. "Impassively, 
Purdy squeezed the trigger of his rifle, then reloaded, raking the 
yard with at least 106 bullets.   As children screamed in pain and 
fear, Purdy placed a 9-mm pistol to his head and killed himself.   
When the four-minute assault was over, five children, ages 6 to 9, 
were dead.   One teacher and 29 pupils were wounded."  (Chow, 
51   Paul M. Barrett, Vanessa O'Connell & Robert Tomsho, Usual Suspect: The Notorious 
TEC-9 Shows Up Again In High-Profile Killings, WALL ST. J.  Apr. 26, 1999, at A-1.
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Slaughter in a School Yard, Time Magazine (Jan. 30, 1989) 
p. 29).52
Although perhaps the most shocking, in 1989 the Stockton school 
shooting was then only the most recent in a series of shooting with assault 
weapons.    Five years earlier, in San Ysidro, California, James Huberty had 
armed himself with a 9mm semiautomatic pistol, a 12 gauge shotgun and a 
9mm UZI semiautomatic rifle and entered a McDonalds restaurant 
occupied by about 45 people.   Huberty fired hundred of rounds, killing 21 
and wounding 15.53   And law enforcement officers from across California 
were reporting that semi-automatic military assault rifles were increasingly 
the weapons of choice of street gangs.
 Not long after the Stockton schoolyard shootings, the California 
legislature adopted the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act54
(hereafter, the AWCA), which  restricted possession of certain kinds of 
weapons similar in some respects to the rifle used in the shooting.55    The 
legislature could well have enacted a law with precision equivalent to that 
of the heating statute; for example, by banning Chinese-made Kalashnikov 
rifles, or perhaps rifles with a certain sequence of serial numbers.  That 
would not, of course, have accomplished much beyond some market effects 
in displacing Chinese-made rifles with similar, if not identical, weapons 
made in Russia or Romania.  The legislature might also have adopted a 
more general and sweeping law, banning all firearms.  But that would have 
gone well beyond the legislature's intention, to restrict particular kinds of 
weapons associated with these mass killings.
   The California legislature's approach to solving this problem 
entailed both specifying a list of mass-produced weapons, and by 
empowering a court to determine, after a petition from the California 
Attorney General and ample notice to the public,  that  a  new weapon 
should also be included within the "species" of assault weapons.  The 
legislature specified in the process those kinds of changes that would not
constitute sufficient modification to cause the weapon to fall outside the 
52 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472, 483 (2000), 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 341 (2000).   I rely 
on the generally excellent account of the legislative history of the AWCA in part because my 
arguments do not rest on the details of this history, but  on the general  approaches reflected in it.
53 Id. 
54 CAL. PENAL CODE §12275 (1989), Jay Mathews, California Adopts Ban on Some 
Assault Guns; Enactment Gives Boost to Other Campaigns, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1989; 
Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, How the NRA Got Shot Down in California, L.A. TIMES MAG., July 30, 
1989.   The circumstances leading to the AWCA are also described at length in Kasler,. 23 Cal. 
4th at 472.
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proscribed category.56   The California Supreme Court has upheld both the 
law and this process of amending the categorization of assault weapons, as 
against claims that (1) the enumerated list of weapons violated equal 
protection by being "irrationally under-inclusive," (2) empowering courts to 
add to the category violated the separation of powers doctrine, and (3) the 
statute violated due process because the categorization was unduly vague 
and failed to give fair warning of prohibited conduct.57
A. A Primer on  Guns:  The Science and Technology of Death (and 
Sport).
The California Legislature had ample reason to act to control the 
kinds of weapons used in mass shootings.   But what "kind" was that?   
Attention quickly focused on only a subset of the types of weapons involved 
-- the "assault weapons" -- and not on the shotguns and pistols involved.  
Some of the terms in the preceding sentences will be unclear to some 
readers, as they may have initially been to some members of the California 
legislature. A quick primer on firearms is required, both to consider 
legislation or to understand this essay.  Knowledgeable readers can skip 
forward to the next section.
   Guns use small explosive charges in small containers (cartridges) to 
propel projectiles out of a cylindrical tube (the barrel) at high velocity.  
Shotguns typically expel some number of pellets; rifles and pistols a single 
bullet with each discharge.  The inner surface of the barrel (the "bore") of a 
shotgun is smooth; the bore of rifles and pistols has spiral grooves ("rifling") 
that causes the bullet to spin as it move down the barrel. The effects of 
bullets on targets, including human bodies, vary according to the laws of 
physics.    The total energy of a bullet is a function of mass and velocity at 
impact:  the higher the energy, the more potential damage.   Damage is also 
affected by whether the bullet deforms as it passes through tissue, and 
whether the bullet is traveling at a high enough velocity to create shock 
56 CAL. PENAL CODE §12276.5 empowers the Superior Court to determine that a new 
weapon not on the proscribed list is nevertheless an assault weapon if  it is "identical to one of the 
assault weapons listed in those subdivisions except for slight modifications or enhancements 
including, but not limited to: a folding or retractable stock;  adjustable sight;  case deflector for 
left- handed shooters;  shorter barrel;  wooden, plastic or metal stock;  larger magazine size;  
different caliber provided that the caliber exceeds .22 rimfire;  or bayonet mount.  The court shall 
strictly construe this paragraph so that a firearm which is merely similar in appearance but not a 
prototype or copy cannot be found to be within the meaning of this paragraph."   
57 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th at 478.
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(sound) waves.   Bullets striking tissue at high velocity do 
considerably more damage than slower moving bullets.58
Firearms also vary according to whether a single pull of the trigger can 
result in firing more than one bullet.  "Fully automatic" weapons (the 
original "machine guns") fire when the trigger is depressed, and continue to 
fire until either the trigger is released or all cartridges are discharged.  The 
"rate of fire" of a weapon is generally described with reference to the 
maximum number of rounds that the weapon could fire in a minute.  Fully 
automatic weapons have a higher rate of fire than other weapons, although 
semiautomatic shotguns can fire a very large number of projectiles in a short 
time.  The potential lethality of a weapon is thus a function of several 
things:  the rate of fire, the weight, velocity and other characteristics of the 
bullet fired, the number of rounds held in the magazine and the potential 
rapidity of reloading.  
Beyond lethality other features of weapons have attracted legislative 
interest, sometimes for reasons that are not obviously connected to 
lethality, including:
 A "thumbhole stock" or "pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously 
beneath the action of the  weapon" -- configurations that may alter how 
the gun is normally held by the user, or a "folding or telescoping stock" 
that makes the gun more compact and easier to conceal. 
 "Flash suppressors" -- devices on the end of barrels that reduce the 
visible light emitted when the gun fires   
 "bayonet mounts" -- fixtures for attaching a bayonet, a kind of knife or 
penetrating weapon to the barrel of the firearm.
It is in the context of the characteristics of the range of modern 
firearms that various legally significant categories have been established.   
For example, fully automatic weapons of all kinds and short barreled or 
"sawed off" shotguns have been subject to federal regulation since they were 
reputed to be the favored weapons  of Al Capone and other gangsters in the 
58 As described by a legislative witness quoted by the California Supreme Court in Kasler, 
"When a high velocity bullet enters the body, Dr. Wintemute explained, "it starts to 'tumble,' as it 
moves through the tissue . . . greatly increasing the amount of tissue which is damaged by direct 
contact with the bullet.   Moreover, as this high-velocity missile travels through the tissue, it 
sends out pressure waves: We've all seen pictures of airplanes breaking the sound barrier, and 
waves moving away from the plane.   The same thing happens as these bullets travel through 
tissue;  these pressure waves ... create what is called 'a temporary cavity' behind the path of the 
bullet, which may be 10 to 15 times--or even greater--the diameter of the bullet itself.  As a result 
of this phenomenon, these high-velocity missiles can damage or destroy organs, break 
bones--including the femur, possibly the strongest bone in the body--without ever touching 
them."  Kasler, 23 Cal. 4th at 484, citing the testimony of Dr. Garen Wintemute of the University 
of California, Davis, Medical School before the Committee of the Whole.  (1 Assem. J. 
(1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) p. 447.)
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1930's.59  Specifying these categories of weapons was and is 
straightforward.   Either a weapon can fire multiple times with one trigger 
pull or it cannot.   Subject to disagreements at the microscopic scale, either 
the barrel of a shotgun is longer than 18 inches or it is not.   But other 
categories are not so easily defined.   
The term "assault weapons" has not been used historically apart from 
the effort  to categorize firearms for the purpose of regulating them.  The 
term "assault rifles," on the other hand, comes from the military 
environment for which these firearms were developed.  The most 
numerically common weapon in the world today is an assault rifle designed 
by the Russian Mikhail Timofeevich Kalashnikov:60 the Abtomat 
Kalashnikov 47 or "AK-47" similar to the weapon used by the Stockton 
schoolyard shooter. The most common version of the "AK-47" fires a bullet 
7.62 mm in diameter and of intermediate weight and holds 30 cartridges in 
a removable magazine.  If there is a cultural prototype for assault weapons, it 
is the AK-47.  According to an Internet webpage devoted to this one 
weapon (itself some evidence of the point), there have been between 30 
and 50 million such rifles manufactured, making it the most widely used 
weapon in the world.61
As is apparent from the preceding paragraph, like automobiles, 
firearms are generally identified by manufacturer and model.  The 
technologies of mass production insure that all weapons of identical
manufacturer and model are substantially identical with regard to function 
and performance.   But, just as there can be many different variations and 
generations of Volkswagen Beetles, there can be great variations among 
weapons given the same general name.   Assault rifles modeled on the AK-
47 were produced in every country allied with the Soviet Union and were 
produced in many different variations.   Among the millions of such rifles 
produced, there were at least dozens of actual variations, as well as different 
designations.
B. Categorizing Assault Weapons
Like most citizens, the average legislator is usually unaware of or 
indifferent to the kinds of details about firearms just discussed, until there is 
59 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).
60 A Russian website, http://kalashnikov.guns.ru/, provides details on the history of the 
weapon and its designer.
61 AK-47.net website: http://www.ak-47.net/ak47/akru/ak47.html [March 6, 2004].
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reason for concern.  But on February 13, 1989, a month after the 
Stockton schoolyard shooting, the California Legislature met in an 
extraordinary session, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, to consider 
what the Speaker described as a matter of "extraordinary importance" and 
"immediacy":  what to do about assault weapons.  As proposed legislation 
was introduced, legislators took different approaches in specifying the 
category of affected  weapons.  As introduced in the Assembly, the 
legislation affected nine specific makes and models of weapons,  such as the 
"AK-47 semiautomatic assault rifle" and the "Uzi semiautomatic assault 
rifle."62  A majority of the Senate preferred a generic description, such as  
"[a]ll semiautomatic action, centerfire rifles that accept detachable 
magazines with a capacity of 20 rounds or more."63
As the legislation moved forward in both houses, the Assembly version 
was amended to drop the generic description, but to expand the list of 
affected weapons to about 40 specific rifles. Also included for the first time 
were certain enumerated semiautomatic pistols and shotguns.64  After  
Governor George Deukmejian, a conservative Republican, indicated 
concerns about the generic description approach, and support for any 
version of the legislation wavering at the margins in the Assembly, the 
generic approached was dropped.65
The approach to the problem of weapons mutation also evolved over 
the course of the legislative process.   Initially, the Assembly version of the 
bill would have created an "Assault Weapons Commission" to decide 
through an administrative process "whether particular firearms are 
legitimate sports or recreational firearms" and thus not banned.66  This 
provision was quickly dropped67, but it reemerged in another form as part 
of a compromise with the Governor.   Under the new provision, which was 
incorporated into the law as passed and signed, the state Attorney General 
was empowered to petition a Superior  Court for an order including within 
the affected category weapons that were roughly identical to weapons on 
the banned list:
Identical . . . except for slight modifications or enhancements 
including, but not limited to:  a folding or retractable stock; adjustable 
sight; case deflector for left-handed shooters; shorter barrel; wooden, 
plastic or metal stock; larger magazine size; different caliber provided 
62 Assembly Bill 357 (introduced January 25, 1989).
63 Senate Bill 292, as amended in the Senate on January 31, 1989.
64 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472, 478-79;  Assembly Bill 357, as amended in the 
Assembly, February 27, 1989.
65 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472,  486 (2000).
66 Assembly Bill 357 (as amended in the Assembly, February 27, 1989).
67 Assembly Bill 357 (as amended in the Assembly, March 2, 1989).
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that the caliber exceeds .22 rim fire; or bayonet mount.  The court 
shall strictly construe this paragraph so that a firearm which is merely 
similar in appearance but not a prototype or copy can not be found to 
be within the meaning of this paragraph.68
In enacting the legislation in 1989, the California Legislature declared 
its intention, and gave additional evidence of both the social problem and 
the problems of categorization it was attempting to solve:
The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons specified in 
Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high 
rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate 
sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger 
that it can be used to kill and injure human beings. It is the intent of 
the Legislature in enacting this chapter to place restrictions on the use 
of assault weapons and to establish a registration and permit procedure 
for their lawful sale and possession. It is not, however, the intent of the 
Legislature by this chapter to place restrictions on the use of those 
weapons which are primarily designed and intended for hunting, target 
practice, or other legitimate sports or recreational activities.69
The 1989 statute did not end the controversy about how to categorize 
and regulate "assault weapons."  Peter Alan Kasler sued to invalidate the 
law.  The California Court of Appeal agreed with Kasler that:  (1) “the ‘list’ 
method employed by the Act [to define "assault weapons"] violates equal 
protection because it does not rationally distinguish between owners of 
regulated and unregulated guns who are identically situated with respect to 
the harm sought to be alleviated,"70 and that, by requiring "a judge to 
legislate," the "add-on" provision of the statute violated constitutionally 
mandated separation of powers.71
In apparent response to the Court of Appeal opinion, while the matter 
remained pending before the California Supreme Court, a bill was 
introduced in 1998 defining assault weapons more generically by reference 
to a list of features.  It was defeated by one vote.72    The next year, 
however, a decade after the first statute was enacted and  effective on the 
first day of the new millennium, the generic description approach the 
California Senate had preferred in 1989 was resurrected and added to the 
68 Assembly Bill 357 (Proposed Conference Report No. 1, May 15, 1989).  
69 CAL. PENAL CODE §12275.5.
70 Kasler v. Lungren,, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1243 (1998), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 264 (1998), 
reversed, Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal. 4th 472 (2000).
71 Kasler v. Lungren, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1252.
72 James P. Sweeney, New Assault Weapon Ban Shot Down; Proposed Overhaul Falls One 
Vote Short in Assembly, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 14, 1998, at A-1.
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statute. Now a weapon can be banned by virtue of being on the 
existing list of manufacturers  and models of weapons, or by being added to 
that list by a Superior Court judge on petition by the Attorney  General, or
by virtue of having one or more particular features.  For example, now 
included within the category "assault weapons" is:
(1) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has the capacity to   
accept a detachable magazine and any one of the following:
 (A) A pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the 
action of the  weapon.
 (B) A thumbhole stock.
 (C) A folding or telescoping stock.
 (D) A grenade launcher or flare launcher.
 (E) A flash suppressor.
 (F) A forward pistol grip.73
Notably, in thus reverting in 1999 to the approach taken in the first drafts 
and in the Senate versions of the legislation a decade earlier, the California 
legislature declared that: 
It was the original intent of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 19 of
the Statutes of 1989 to ban all assault weapons, regardless of their 
name, model number, or manufacture. It is the purpose of this act to 
effectively achieve the Legislature's intent to prohibit all assault 
weapons.74
Not long after the new statute took effect, the decision of the Court 
of Appeal invalidating the 1989 law was reversed in the California Supreme 
Court, which rejected both the equal protection and separation of powers 
challenges to the Act.  As against the equal protection challenge, the Court
held that,  "[t]he step-by-step approach adopted here--the list plus the 
add-on provision -- does not violate principles of equal protection.," citing 
familiar case authority that a legislature may pursue reform "'one step at a 
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute 
to the legislative mind.'"75  The Court also rejected the separation of 
powers argument, finding that the scheme by which the Attorney General 
presented candidate weapons for inclusion on the banned list for final 
adjudication by the judiciary was entirely in keeping with the tripartite 
system of government.76
73 CAL. PENAL CODE §12776.1, effective January 1, 2000.
74 Section 12 of Stats.1999, c. 129 (Senate Bill 23).
75 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th at 488 (citing Warden v. State Bar, 21 Cal.4th 628, 645 
(1999), (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955),  75 S.Ct. 461, 99 
L.Ed. 563)). 
76 Kasler v. Lockyer, 23 Cal.4th at 491-498.
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III. HARDER CASES AND INTERPRETIVETHEORY.
On first impressions, it is not easy to see how a legislature could have 
done a better job at specifying the category of assault weapons.  As with all 
efforts at communication, however, the real test comes at the receiving end.  
In the scheme enacted in California, the meaning of the assault weapon 
category can be interpreted by courts in two contexts: (1) A court in a 
prosecution brought under the statute, deciding whether a particular object 
possessed by the defendant is a banned weapon; or (2) a Superior Court 
deciding whether a class of objects should be added to the list, on the 
petition of the Attorney General.
 Consider the following possibilities:
1.     The personal flamethrower:  A defendant is charged with 
unlawful possession of a weapon he has himself invented and constructed.  
Rather than bullets, it emits small globules of burning fluid, propelled by 
highly compressed gas.  The defendant admits possession but demurs to the 
charge on the ground that his weapon is not an assault weapon?  A judge 
must decide.
2.   The "Mini M-16":  The Attorney General petitions the Superior 
Court to add to the list of banned weapons a newly modified version of the 
military's M-16 rifle.  In contrast to the 5.56 mm caliber bullet of the 
original, the modified weapon fires a bullet of the same  weight, but one 
that is longer and smaller in diameter (5.00 mm).  A judge must decide 
whether to grant the petition. 
The results in both cases will depend on the interpretive theory, 
implicit  or explicit, of the court.   The court in search of an explicit theory 
of statutory interpretation will have a great many choices from a 
voluminous and sophisticated literature, including intentionalism,77
modified intentionalism,78 new textualism,79 public justification theory,80
77 REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
(1975)
78 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
79 Generally ascribed to Justice Scalia, as in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION (1997).  See also, William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 621 (1990); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in 
Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235 (1997).
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dynamic interpretation theory,81 and public choice theory.82  A full 
comparative accounting of these choices is unnecessary here.  A couple of 
examples, drawn in perhaps exaggerated form, will suffice to illustrate the 
range of choices. 
A. New Textualism.
"New textualists"  like Justice Scalia will likely direct the judges faced 
with our two "hard cases" to look hard at the words of the statute, with 
dictionary and calculator at hand.  These are not, it turns out, hard cases at 
all.  The defendants in both cases are innocent.  The personal flamethrower 
is not an assault weapon because it is not a firearm.  The AWCA applies to 
"firearms" of various kinds and the California Penal Code defines "firearms" 
as "devices that . . . expel . . . a projectile . . . by the force of  . . . any 
explosion or other form of combustion."  Though a burning hunk of fuel 
might be a "projectile," and releasing compressed gas might be viewed by 
some as a kind of  "explosion", the AWCA clearly means to include only 
those explosions that are produced by some form of combustion, evidenced 
by the phrase "explosion or other form of combustion" (emphasis supplied).  
As educated people have known since the time of Lavoisier, combustion 
entails rapid oxidation or other chemical combination and not merely the 
expansion of a compressed gas.   If legislators had wanted to ban compressed 
gas weapons, they certainly had the capacity to do so.  To include this 
weapon will encourage lack of linguistic precision and general care on the 
part of the legislature.
The question of whether to add the "Mini-16" to the banned list is 
even easier to answer, based on the plain words of the statute.   It permits 
extending the assault weapons designation to weapons of altered caliber, 
"provided the caliber exceeds .22 rimfire."   Simple calculations, performed 
by anyone not trained in fuzzy math, reveal that 5.00 mm is 00.19685 
inches, which plainly does not "exceed" .22 caliber in diameter.  If the 
legislature meant "exceed" in some other sense, they certainly could have 
said so.  Next case.
80 See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History without Legislative Intent: The Public 
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999).
81 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 35.
82 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 423 (1988).
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B. Other Interpretive Theories:  Intentionalism at  the Core
Adherents to virtually all other theories of interpretation will find 
these harder cases, albeit for different reasons.  Traditional intentionalists83
will focus on what kinds of weapons the legislature intended to regulate, 
perhaps through the exercise of "imaginative reconstruction"  of what the 
enacting legislature would have thought of the weapons at issue.84
Purposivists like Hart and Sacks85 will direct their attention to the 
apparent purposes of the statute and then try to determine whether those 
purposes are best served by including, or excluding, the questioned 
weapons.  As William Eskridge has argued persuasively, at least as a general 
matter, both the intentions of legislators and statutory purposes are 
frequently indeterminate.   Eskridge would counsel against the 
"archaeological"  projects of intentionalism and purposivism and for a 
"dynamic"  approach:  a judge should embrace the inevitable and become a 
willing, pragmatic collaborator in the project of constructing good law, 
appropriate to the slightly modified problem  presented by the new 
weapons.86
One of the aspirations of interpretive theory accounts for one 
shortcoming of all these theories.  Intent on devising a theory of 
interpretation that is general in application, theorists have been disinclined 
to take explicit account of the huge variability in the domains in which 
statutes operate.    For example, statutes vary importantly in age, in the rate 
of change in the realms to which they pertain, in the degree to which 
precision is possible, and at what costs.   Although illustrative examples are 
often detailed and concrete, interpretive theory attends in the main to 
legislation that is unspecified and generic, or represented by exemplars with 
unexamined features.   One of my aims here is to suggest principled ways of
taking account of the differences in the realms in which the law operates, 
and the degree to which those realms are predictable and well understood.  
Similarly, scholars examining the consequences of varying degrees of rule 
precision have sharpened the analytic tools we have for considering the 
83 E.g., DICKERSON, supra note 76.
84 ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION supra note 5 
at 526. 
85 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 166-167, 1148- 79 
86 ESKRIDGE, supra note 35.
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costs and benefits.87   These tools do not, however, really provide 
the means to take account of differences in the realms in which law 
operates.
C. Reexamining Easy Cases.
We  can begin by acknowledging one of the useful insights of 
interpretivist theory, that legal terms typically have "core" and "penumbral" 
meanings (in the words of H.L.A. Hart) or exhibit "prototype effects" (as 
most effectively explained by Steven Winter).88  Taken together, the 
various interpretive theories exhibit a similar core-and-periphery schema.  
All of the various strains of interpretivist theory converge in the easiest 
cases.  If a unanimous Congress yesterday declared March 14 a national 
holiday to commemorate Einstein's birth, and specified the date with 
reference to Greenwich Mean Time as indicated on the atomic clocks of 
the Naval Observatory, then an entire convention of interpretive theorists 
would quickly agree as to whether a given event occurred on Einstein Day, 
even if debates about the meaning and intended consequences of the term 
"holiday" might engage them for days.  Interpretivist opinions diverge 
primarily with regard to what stance judges should adopt when legislative 
purposes are ambiguous and intent is ancient, unknowable, or unclearly 
expressed, where intent and text seem to conflict, or where circumstances 
and/or applicable normative principles have evolved. Since there seems not 
much to talk about, not much intellectual energy has been expended in the 
close examination of easy cases.  
Against this instinct, I aim to show in the sections that follow that 
interpretive theory cannot reasonably proceed without an adequate 
understanding of how legislatures can reasonably communicate about 
categories, even in seemingly relatively easy cases.   I will suggest that a 
close analysis and the application of science to apparently easy cases may 
offer insights useful in thinking about the hard cases as well.  In order to 
focus on the aspects of theory I want to develop here, I will thus assume 
away the major problems endemic to what Eskridge calls "statutory
archaeology."89  I accept Eskridge's point that both intentionalism and 
purposivism are incomplete, as traditionally articulated, as either a 
87 Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); 
Kaplow, supra note 15; Sunstein, supra note 14; Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and 
Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000).
88 Stephen L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive 
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1174 (1989).
89 For a reasonable summary of the critiques, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 35, at 14-47.
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descriptive or a normative theory of interpretation.90  Nevertheless, all 
interpretive theories treat text and intent as at least potentially relevant.  
For simplicity I will assume that the interpretive theory of any future  judge 
will cause him or her to take account of the legislature's words, intent and 
purposes, at least when there are few difficulties determining any of these.   
A reasonable judge, I will argue, should also take account of the situation a 
legislature may have confronted in trying to solve the problem before it.
By the same logic, I agree with Justice Scalia that we should 
generally attend closely to the statutory text and whether a more careful 
legislature might have said more clearly what it meant, in order to provide 
incentives to legislatures to speak as clearly as they reasonably can.  Unlike 
Justice Scalia, however, I believe that we should take explicit account not 
only of whether the legislature might have spoken more clearly, but also of 
the degree of difficulty in doing so in the given area of regulation, and the 
inevitable costs, as well as benefits, of maximal feasible clarity.  The work in 
cognitive science and decision theory described below provides the means 
of  making these assessments.
IV. LEGISLATIVE  CATEGORIZATION AS A CONSTRAINT 
SATISFACTION  PROBLEM
What was the problem confronting the California legislature after the 
shooting in Stockton?   Initially, the problem was likely seen as "How do we 
prevent THAT from happening again."   What was meant by THAT was 
subject to radically different interpretations.  The "problem" exemplified by 
the shooting quickly came to be framed as how to limit the availability of 
particular kinds of firearms in California.  As the gun lobby frequently 
points out, there is always a person attached to the finger on the trigger --
in this case an obviously deranged man for whom hindsight would prescribe 
treatment or incarceration.  The Stockton shooting that came to epitomize 
the "assault weapons problem" might as easily have become emblematic of 
hate crimes or failures in the mental health and parole systems or 
inadequacies in security in public schools.91   How the problem came to be
constructed as a matter of the availability of assault weapons is beyond my 
90 Id. at 15.
91 Patrick Purdy, the shooter, was reportedly motivated in part by his hatred of Asians, and 
had extensive prior contacts with both the mental health and criminal justice systems in 
Stockton. Schoolyard Killer's Hatred of Minorities Told in Report, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Oct. 6, 1989, at A-4.
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scope here.92  Once the problem was framed in terms of regulating a 
category of firearms, it became what is called in some disciplines a 
constraint satisfaction problem.93
Constraint satisfaction problems entail finding a path to a goal while 
simultaneously satisfying a number of constraints.  Life is full of constraint 
satisfaction problems.  How can I find a restaurant that both my wife and 
my mother will like, within 30 minutes drive of my home that will be 
reasonably quiet and not terribly expensive? Crossword puzzles are another 
simple example:  a given letter is subject to the two constraints of fitting 
into two different English words in both the horizontal and the vertical. 
What are the constraints on legislation?  These will vary according to the 
context.94  It may be that some statutes are passed purely for public 
relations value, with little concern for how they might be interpreted by 
citizens or judges.  But drafting legislation intended to have any significant 
effect in the real world on behavior, is invariably subject to multiple 
constraints, including constraints regarding precision, economy, flexibility, 
and fitness to the problem at hand. 
(a) Precision.  Laws can be imprecise in different ways.  To use a 
familiar example, an ambiguous statute might refer to "banks," but not 
indicate whether it pertains to financial institutions or the land adjacent to 
rivers.  A vague statute might refer to "property," but not indicate whether 
it refers to real property, personal property, intellectual  property, or all of 
them.  A precise statute will enable both citizens and judges to determine 
either directly or through some definite procedure whether an object or 
behavior is within the legislature's intended category. 
Philosophers distinguish varying kinds of imprecision and argue about 
whether vagueness is a property of language, a property of the world, or a 
consequence of using language to refer to the world.95 Although vagueness
92 See, for example, Joel Best, IMAGES OF ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1995).
93 "Formally, a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) is defined over a constraint network, 
which consists of a finite set of variables, each associated with a domain of values, and a set of 
constraints. A solution is an assignment of a value to each variable from its domain such that all 
the constraints are satisfied. Typical constraint satisfaction problems are to determine whether a 
solution exists, to find one or all solutions, and to find an optimal solution relative to a given cost 
function."  
Rina Dechter, Constraint Satisfaction,  (paper available at 
http://www.ics.uci.edu/~dechter/publications/r68.html, visited March 6, 2004)
94 Steven L. Schwarcz suggests the following constraints at work in the drafting of uniform 
state laws by private bodies such as the American Law Institute:  clarity, simplicity, flexibility, 
fairness, consistency and completeness.  Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 924-925.
95 A collection entitled, VAGUENESS: A READER (Rosana Keefe & Peter Smith eds., 
1996), contains a sampling of the major views on the subject.  Particularly for philosophers in the 
analytic tradition, vagueness poses very important problems.  An extensive bibliography on the
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is, self-referentially, a somewhat vague concept, we can usefully distinguish 
between ambiguity, generality, and vagueness.  Homonyms (like “bank” in 
the previous example) are examples of ambiguity.  We can typically 
disambiguate them by adding context:  once we know the statute is in the 
Financial Institutions Code, we are reasonably certain what sort of “bank” it 
is to which a section of that code probably refers.
As one philosopher has written, “vagueness is ambiguity on a grand 
and systematic scale.”96  In contrast to the finite number of disambiguated 
meanings of an ambiguous term, vague terms have potentially infinite 
possible meanings.   Consider terms like “tall” or “heap.” Is someone 5’11” 
tall?  Do 100 grains of wheat constitute a “heap”?   These situations give rise 
to the Sorites Paradox, after the Greek word for “heap” (soros), which went 
roughly like this:
1 grain of wheat does not make a heap. 
If 1 grain of wheat does not make a heap then 2 grains of wheat do 
not. 
If 2 grains of wheat do not make a heap then 3 grains do not. 
... 
If 9,999 grains of wheat do not make a heap then 10,000 do not. 
-------------------------------------------
Therefore, 10,000 grains of wheat do not make a heap.97
Philosophers describe vague predicates as having borderline cases, fuzzy 
boundaries, and being susceptible to the Sorites Paradox.98
The lack of precision  in categorization leads to interpretive errors 
of two possible kinds:  errors of inclusion and errors  of  exclusion.  
Accordingly, legislators face two different kinds of precision constraints.  In 
order to meet the constraint of inclusion, the category specification must 
include as many as possible of the "kinds" of weapons the legislature wants 
to regulate (e.g., a firearm that has ". . . such a high rate of fire and capacity 
for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is 
substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure
subject can be found at a website described as "an evolving resource" for philosophers concerned 
with vagueness, at http://www.btinternet.com/~justin.needle/ (visited March 6, 2004).
96 Kit Fine, Vagueness, Truth and Logic, reprinted in VAGUENESS: A READER, supra
note 95, at 136.
97 The Sorites paradox was one of seven puzzles attributed to the logician Eubulides of 
Miletes, a contemporary of Aristotle.   An analog was the Bald Man (phalakros) paradox, in 
which grains of wheat were replaced with hairs on a head.  TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, 
VAGUENESS, 8-9 (1994). Williamson's book is itself something of a landmark in philosophical 
studies of vagueness. This vast and varied literature goes well beyond my purposes here.  
98 VAGUENESS: A READER, supra note 95, at 4.
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human beings.")99.  In order to satisfy the constraint of exclusion, 
the category specification must not include the "kinds" of weapons the 
legislature does not want to regulate (e.g., ". . . weapons which are primarily 
designed and intended for hunting, target practice, or other legitimate 
sports or recreational activities.").  
These constraints do not merely reflect policy choices for legislators. 
They can rise to the level of constitutional principle. In order to comport 
with the "first essential of due process of law," a category with legal 
significance must be described in language such that "persons of common 
intelligence" will not "necessarily guess at its meaning."100  Thus, given a 
particular firearm, ordinary people must be able to determine with some 
certainty whether the firearm is, or is not, an "assault weapon."  As I will 
suggest below, there may be means of specifying the category of assault 
weapons other than detailed lists that avoid the vagueness constraint, but it 
is likely that the prefatory language in  the statute itself, standing alone, 
would have been declared unconstitutionally vague.   
(b) Economy.  The category must be defined within parameters of 
time, space, money and information that constrain real legislators, judges 
and citizens.  It might be theoretically possible for a legislature to develop 
an exhaustive list of all the individual firearms in the world at a particular 
moment in time, perhaps by serial number, and to indicate as to whether 
each is an assault weapon.   To do so in practice would require an enormous 
expenditure of time as well as access to information that no legislature can 
possibly obtain.  Indeed, there is apparently no reliable exhaustive list even 
of the nuclear weapons in the arsenal of the former Soviet Union, to say 
nothing of  the 30-50 (!) million Kalashnikov-style rifles in the world.  All 
means of describing a category of objects other than such a list are less 
perfect.
(c) Flexibility.  Even a perfect enumeration would not reach weapons 
not yet produced, either on preexisting or new designs. Unless the 
Legislature wants to constantly revisit the definition of the category, it must 
specify a way in which weapons not currently produced can be determined 
to be in the category.  In this case "not currently produced" may extend 
both to the potential for minor future variations (shortening a barrel by an 
inch, for example, or replacing a wooden stock with a plastic stock) and 
entirely new inventions (e.g., weapons that use compressed gases rather 
than explosives, or burning globules rather than bullets).
99 §12275.5 supra note 68.
100 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).  
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(d) Fitness to the Problem.   For our purposes, we assume that the 
legislation is intended to have an effect on the problem identified by the 
legislature.  In the case of assault weapons, one can make a case that "the 
problem" was perceived in one or more of the following ways:
(1) Positivist/Pragmatic Fitness: The problem is the unregulated 
availability of weapons that makes it possible for disturbed individuals to 
kill dozens of people before the police can stop them.  This construction of 
the problem would cause legislators to focus on the actual, technical 
lethality of weapons. 
(2) Political Fitness, Cynical Version.  The problem may be that 
other people, especially voters, perceive these weapons to be a problem and 
identify particular kinds of weapons, especially those used in the most 
publicized killings, as those that legislators must address.  Problems that 
confront legislators are always socially constructed, and represent real 
political problems whether the "real" problem exists or not.  Cynics will 
note that some weapons seem to be included based entirely on appearance, 
especially similarity in appearance to certain military weapons used in 
highly publicized instances,  rather than lethality or function or anything 
else that might actually matter.
(3)   Political Fitness, Expressivist Version.  As critics of the law-as-
communication metaphor have noted, law has social functions beyond the 
explicit formulation of categories, rules, and consequences.  Law has 
expressivist functions as well. Appearances do matter. From  this  
perspective, banning from civilian use weapons that merely appear similar 
to military weapons may serve an important expressive function, increasing 
the symbolic separation between the military and civilian spheres of life and 
signaling disapproval of would-be civilian Rambos.  One need only visit the 
"hobbies" section of any magazine stand to see the evidence of a subculture 
devoted to guns, especially military-style weapons.  Legislation may express 
a point of view with regard to this subculture.  The California Court of 
Appeal accepted the expressivist interpretation, holding that the 
Legislature might take account of difference in appearance, banning 
"meaner-looking" firearms, but not make distinctions between firearms of 
identical appearance and equivalent function.101
101 Kasler v. Lungren, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1262 (1998), reversed, Kasler v. Lockyer, 
23 Cal. 4th 472 (2000).
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A. The Costs of Precision:  Categorization, Diagnosis and Signal 
Detection Theory
We note initially that some of the constraints on legislation are 
interrelated. First, because there will always be some uncertainty in 
classification at the margins, there is an inevitable tradeoff between the 
constraints of inclusion and exclusion.  If the category is specified very 
broadly, it may be applied to future cases a legislature with perfect foresight 
would not have included.  If specified narrowly, the category will not 
encompass weapons that were intended to be included.  Assume with 
perfect knowledge and infinite time, a legislature could specify the set of all 
"assault weapons" perfectly.   In other words, the perfect legislature could 
partition all weapons in the world into two sets:  assault weapons and all 
others.   In graphic form, let the vertical line in Figure 1 be the "real" 
boundary between the set of "assault weapons" and "other weapons" (as 
determinable with infinite time, resources and foresight).   Any 
categorization in the real  world will depart from the ideal.  As 
operationalized by the entire legal system,  the result might be as 
represented by the dotted line in Figure 1, indicating  errors of both 
inclusion and exclusion.
Figure 1
Ambiguity and Two Kinds of Errors
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Although the legislature can strive for categorical specifications that 
will reduce errors of both types, it cannot eliminate them.  There are,  
however,  ways of thinking more systematically about the tradeoffs.  The 
two kinds of error (overinclusion and underinclusion) parallel the potential 
error in any diagnostic regime.   Consider, for example, a blood screening 
test for a particular cancer.  The test can only indicate the concentration of 
a particular chemical compound in the blood.   Even leaving aside 
measurement errors, no such test is absolutely definitive.   There will always 
be both false positives and false negatives, at whatever cutpoint is 
established.   Moreover, there is typically no way to reduce the number of 
false positives without increasing the number of false negatives.
In diagnostic medicine, the relationships among these variables are 
described with reference to various statistics computed on the variables in 
Table 1. 
Table 1
Possible Outcomes of a Diagnostic Test 
                    DISEASE
        + -
+
True Positive 
(TP)
False Positive 
(FP)
T
E
S
T -
False Negative 
(FN)
True Negative 
(TN)
The power of the test to detect true positives is called the sensitivity of the 
test, equal to TP/TP+FN.  The specificity of the test, TN/TN+FP, is a 
measure of the power of the test to identify true negatives.102   "True" and 
"false" in the case of diagnostic tests is determined with reference to an 
assumed ideal state of perfect knowledge. In medical diagnosis, the 
functional equivalent of perfect knowledge is supplied by the passage of 
time and increasingly more certain tests.     Of course, we have no perfect 
analog in law to the "true diagnosis."  Rather, we have postulated as the 
standard the subjective intentions of the legislature, were they able to be 
perfectly expressed at one time and perfectly understood at another.   With 
102 There are many other measures of diagnostic tests that are commonly computed with 
regard to diagnostic tests, e.g., the positive likelihood ratio, the negative likelihood ratio, the 
positive predictive value, and the negative predictive value.
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that caveat, by analogy to the medical terms, the sensitivity of a 
categorization indicates how well the categorization will result in the 
inclusion of cases the legislature would have included, and its specificity the 
degree to which the categorization avoids including instances the legislature 
would have excluded.   
Medical tests, like statutory interpretations, are rarely completely 
determinate, generating a certain positive/negative decision. But binary 
decisions must be made:  to prescribe a drug or not, to rule for the plaintiff 
or the defendant.  Diagnostic tests typically yield a number in a range, along 
which a single "cutpoint" must be established in order to yield a binary 
interpretation.  As the cutpoint changes, the probabilities of false positives 
and false negatives will necessarily vary inversely.  Which cutpoint is 
selected for decisional purposes will depend on how the relative risks of 
false positives and false negatives are viewed.  Risk sensitivity will vary both 
by interpreter and by situation.   In medicine, our willingness to tolerate 
false negatives varies with the potential seriousness of the disease at issue, 
and tolerance for false positives with the cost and burdens of a potentially 
unnecessary course of treatment.  There is no perfect analog in statutory 
interpretation to the concept of "cutpoint," but obviously different statutory 
interpreters, judicial and otherwise, will have varying interpretations of the 
same statutory language.  In the case of either the diagnostic test or the 
statutory categorization, the overall risks -- of overinclusion or 
underinclusion in the case of statutes -- will depend in part on the 
effectiveness of the legislative categorization.
One measure of the overall effectiveness of a diagnostic test was 
originally developed to analyze the efficiency of radar systems.  Radar 
operators must decide whether a given "blip" on the screen is an aircraft 
rather than a flock of geese or electronic noise.   The systematic study of 
such problems is the province of signal detection theory.103   Like doctors 
interpreting tests or judges interpreting statutes, operators must interpret a 
somewhat ambiguous signal, and like doctors or judges, they may also vary 
the stringency with which a particular test result or signal is assessed.   One 
way to represent the overall performance of a radar system, a diagnostic test, 
or a category specification is by plotting a "receiver operating characteristic" 
curve or "ROC curve."104   As applied to the specification of categories, for 
103 A good overview of signal detection theory can be found in Kenneth R. Hammond et al., 
Making Better Use of Scientific Knowledge: Separating Truth from Justice, in JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 
2000). 
104 For a readable introduction to ROC curves and associated concepts, see John A. Swets et 
al., Better Decisions through Science, 283 SCI. AM. 82 (2000).  See also, John A. Swets, 
Enhancing Diagnostic Decisions, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN 
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every method of specification, there is some probability of both false 
positives (overinclusion) or false negatives (underinclusion), a probability 
that varies with the stringency with which the category is interpreted.  If we 
plot the probability of false positives and false negatives as the stringency of 
interpretation varies, we get the associated ROC curve for the method of 
specification, as in Figure 2.  
INTERDISCIPLINARY READER supra note 103.  In the former work, Swets indicates that the 
initials in "ROC curves" stand, somewhat redundantly for "relative operating curves."  I adopt the 
former, given the lower risk of ambiguity.
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Figure 2
ROC Curve for a Statute
The diagonal line in Figure 2 represents chance accuracy:  a 
diagnostic test equivalent to flipping a coin or a categorical specification in 
a language no one can understand.  The better the method of categorical 
specification, the more the ROC curve bends toward the upper left, as the 
likelihood of true positives and true negatives increases (or, obviously, as 
the number of false positives and false negatives declines).105   In Figure 2, 
the solid curve thus represents a categorical specification that is superior (in 
terms of eventual errors produced) to that represented by the dotted line.  
The shape of the ROC curve reflects the relative balance between the 
sensitivity and specificity of the categorization.  The overall effectiveness of 
a diagnostic test or categorical specification can be reduced to a single 
number, the area under the ROC curve -- sometimes referred to as the 
AUC (for "area under curve").   It is worth noting however, that such a 
single number might obscure differences between categorization methods 
that vary according to whether they are better at avoiding underinclusion 
105 Because by the probabilities of a false positive and true positive (and true negative and 
false negative) always sum to unity, by convention we attend only to the curve reflecting true 
positives and true negatives.
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or overinclusion, a fact reflected by the shape of the ROC curve, but not 
the AUC.
The AUC may nevertheless be a useful single metric of the 
accuracy of the diagnostic test or, in our case, the degree to which the 
categorical specification will be interpreted as intended.  Put another way, 
the area under the ROC curve indicates how much of the determination of 
category membership is left to the discretion of the interpreting judge, 
agency or citizen.   Given the assumptions about democratic theory we have 
been operating under, the greater the area under the ROC curve, the better 
the specification.    Obviously, a legislature wishing to exercise maximal 
influence over the future will want to develop methods for specifying 
legislative categories that will push the ROC curve for the statutory 
language as far to the upper left as possible, thereby reducing future 
interpretive errors.
To translate all this back to our continuing problem of how to 
define "assault weapons," the risk of under-inclusion can be reduced by 
specifying the category in broader terms, but not without increasing the 
likelihood of banning weapons the legislature would have not have banned 
were the question put to it directly.   In both the medical and the legal 
example, no matter how good the diagnostic test or the category  
specification, there will always be some degree of error requiring a decision 
about the tradeoff between the respective risks of false positives and false 
negatives, between the risks of overinclusion or underinclusion.  The cost of 
those tradeoffs is entirely contextual and external to the issue of accuracy 
itself.  A falsely positive diagnosis may lead only to unnecessary worry, or it 
may lead to a dangerous course of unnecessary treatment.  Errors in 
legislative categorization lead to similar considerations:  How significant is 
the unintended banning of a kind of weapon widely used by duck hunters 
(e.g., semiautomatic shotguns), compared to the risk of leaving untouched a 
kind of weapon really useful only against crowds of people (e.g., the 
ominously named Street Sweeper)?  Obviously, legislators of different 
political persuasions and representing differing constituencies will come to 
different assessments of risks and value. 
The final statute adopted by majority votes may obscure these 
underlying conflicts and concerns.  Efforts to create legislative history to 
guide subsequent interpretations may reveal them, although textualist 
interpreters may ignore them.  Sometimes the legislature will send some 
interpretive guidance along with the statute, in the form of a statement 
about presumptions to be applied or statements of legislative intent.  These 
may affect the shape of the statutory ROC curve -- the relative concern 
with overinclusion or underinclusion -- but they cannot by themselves 
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increase the area under the curve -- the precision of the statutory 
categorization.  
It remains to be seen whether merely mapping the categorizing 
decisions of legislators into the language of science has any particular 
utility.  Certainly, legislators operating purely on the basis of naïve theories 
of categorization and on common sense have long been thinking about risks 
of overinclusion and underinclusion.  What are the consequences of 
inadvertently banning a "recreational firearm," as against the consequences 
of failing to ban an especially dangerous "assault weapon"?  Clearly, the 
question can be thought about without ROC curves.   But one benefit of 
the scientific framing of the issue is that it might facilitate being able to 
consider all the risks of error simultaneously.    
The psychological sciences tell us that we may perceive the situation 
differently according to how we frame such questions of risk.106  Precisely 
how these phenomena might play out in the instant context is uncertain.  
For the moment, it is perhaps enough to contrast the categorizing 
inclinations of two otherwise identical legislators, one thinking most 
intently on the possibility that a slightly modified assault weapon will 
escape regulation and be used in another Stockton schoolyard massacre, 
and the other legislator thinking primarily of the possibility that the 
innocent hunters in his district will be caught up in inadvertent regulatory 
excess.  Our intuitions and political experience, as well as behavioral 
science, suggest that both values and sensitivities to different kinds of risk 
will affect how the two kinds of risk are evaluated.  
The weighing of such risks is embedded throughout law.    The 
criminal law must be constructed so as to take account both of the 
possibility of convicting the innocent and acquitting the innocent.  A 
system that actually seeks to follow Blackstone's ratio -- "better that ten 
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer" -- will look quite 
different with the acceptable tradeoff set at a different number.107  Science 
can help with thinking about how to weigh the risks,108 and it can help us 
106 Much of  this work originated with Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky.  See, , Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 
ECONOMETRICA, 47 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of 
Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973); Daniel Kahnerman & Amos Tversky, Choices, 
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahnerman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI . 453 (1981).
107 Terry Connolly, Decision Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous 
Acquittals, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
READER, supra note 103 at 229, 232;  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 358 
(9th ed. 1783);  See also, Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: 
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 110 n 22 (1999).
108 For example, Connolly, supra note 107, uses formal Decision Theory, based on notions of 
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reduce those risks, but it cannot decide the ultimately normative and 
political questions that inevitably follow the existence of unavoidable 
uncertainty in applying law to life.   
With regard to assault weapons in California, it is clear that the 
calculation of these risks by the California legislature (that is, different 
legislatures) changed between 1989 and 1999.   In adopting a more general 
categorical specification in 1999,  the California legislature displayed more 
willingness to risk unintentionally banning some "sporting weapons" in 
order to achieve the goal of "banning all assault weapons."   What the 
legislature could not do was simultaneously eliminate the risks of both over 
and under-inclusion.  But it might have better satisfied these dual 
constraints by taking advantage of the science of categorization, as I suggest 
below.
B. Constitutional Constraints:  Void-for-Vagueness,  Separation of 
Powers and the Non-delegation Doctrine
There were other constraints on the California legislature imposed by 
the Constitution.  Here, I refer not to the Second Amendment109 but to 
two doctrines deeply embedded in different parts of constitutional law:  due 
process and the separation of powers in a tripartite system of government. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been 
interpreted as a requirement that the legislature pass penal laws that "define 
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."110  Regardless of 
where the legislature determines to draw the boundary between "assault 
weapons" and "lawful weapons," if it does so in a sufficiently indeterminate 
way, it risks a court declaring the statute "void for vagueness".  Vagueness is 
itself a vague concept, which encompasses concepts philosophers would call 
expected utility theory, to analyze the consequences of setting different evidentiary thresholds for 
conviction in criminal cases.  Using no formal theory, Colin Diver presented a thoughtful analysis 
of the tradeoffs embedded in what he called "rule precision," in Diver, supra note 87.    Notable 
recent efforts along the same lines are Sunstein, supra note 87, and Kaplow, supra note 87.
109 Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U L. REV. 793 
(1998); Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 831 
(1998).
110 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 357 (1983)
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ambiguity, vagueness and contestibility.111   As a constitutional 
matter, the notion of indeterminacy embodied in "void for vagueness" 
doctrine encompasses concerns in how statutes may be construed by three 
audiences:  citizens, the police and courts.
Accordingly, a legislature sensitive only to risks of unintended  
exclusion could not constitutionally ban possession of "deadly weapons" as a 
means of insuring that "assault weapons" are banned, because "deadly 
weapon" is a radically indeterminate concept.   An astonishing variety of 
objects and instrumentalities have been used to inflict serious injury or 
death, and there is no indication that human creativity and/or depravity in 
this regard has been exhausted.112  In the face of such a law, a citizen 
would not know whether possessing a brick, a baseball bat  or sharp pencil 
put her at risk.  A police officer would be granted enormous discretion in 
deciding whom to arrest.   A court would have similarly unbridled 
discretion in deciding whether any violation had occurred.
One way the legislature might reduce the uncertainty with which the 
words of a statute are viewed by the citizenry is to delegate the detailed 
removal of uncertainty to another branch of government at a future point 
in time:  an administrative agency of the executive branch or, as in the case 
of the California assault weapons law, to the executive (the Attorney 
General, who may file a petition to add a weapon) and to the judiciary (a 
Superior Court judge, who may grant or deny the petition).  This may, 
however, run afoul of other principles deriving from the tripartite structure 
of government:  the separation of powers and the non-delegation doctrine.
In theory, the non-delegation doctrine limits the power of the 
legislative branch to delegate its legislative function to any non-legislative 
entity, but in practice, it especially limits administrative agencies and the 
executive.  As Bernard Bell summarizes the argument for using the 
nondelegation doctrine to limit vagueness in statutes: 
. . .[The] remarkable vagueness of contemporary statutes results from 
one of two causes: (1) elected representatives' efforts to avoid 
responsibility so as to ensure their own re-election, which critics view 
as a political pathology or (2) disagreement among a legislative 
majority, in which case, critics urge, legislation should remain   
111 Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. 
L. REV. 509, 512-513 (1994).  Waldron's piece is part of a small but very useful Symposium, 
entitled Void for Vagueness.
112 For example, California courts have determined that some dogs and some shoes are 
"deadly weapons" under the "assault with a deadly weapon" statute (CAL. PENAL CODE 245), 
People v. Nealis, 232 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 283 Cal.Rptr. 376 (1991) (sufficiently large attack 
dogs); People v. Aguilar, 16 Cal. 4th 1023 (1997) (hobnailed or steel-toed boots).
44
unenacted. Neither avoidance of responsibility nor the passage of 
legislation despite fundamental disagreements accord with the 
principles of liberal democracy.113
 Plainly, democratic theory would not countenance a statute 
empowering a federal bureaucracy or a court to "adopt such rules in 
furtherance of the common welfare as it sees fit."   As with vagueness, the 
question is not whether, but how much, is left to future determination.   
The U.S. Supreme Court has taken a rather expansive view, requiring only 
that Congress "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform."  J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).  As 
Justice Scalia noted,
In the history of the Court we have found the requisite 
"intelligible principle" lacking in only two statutes, one of which 
provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the 
other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy 
on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the 
economy by assuring "fair competition."   See Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935);  A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 
837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935).  Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
Once a statute passes the test of minimal determinacy, the Court has 
established in Chevron114 a preference that the federal courts defer to the 
interpretive capacities of administrative agencies. But the vagueness and 
non-delegation doctrines establish constraints of minimal determinacy for 
statutes, a constraint that varies with context, including the different 
audiences to which statutes speak. 
Delegating greater specificity to an administrative agency or court may 
relieve the citizen from the uncertainties of a vague statute, but leave to the 
agency or court so much discretion that the agency or court is exercising 
the prototypically legislative function.  The risks involved are analogous:  
will a court or agency be so unconstrained by the language of the statute 
that its decisions effectively constitute legislating?   In the Kasler case,  the 
Court of Appeal found that the "add-on" provision of the AWCA "requires 
113 Bernard Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma 
and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 197-98 (1999)
114 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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a judge to legislate."115    As noted earlier, the California Supreme 
Court disagreed, emphasizing that most of the decision-making in the "add-
on" provision would rest with the Attorney General, whose decisions were 
subject to review by the courts, which played only a "very narrow, 
essentially adjudicatory" role in the determining of whether a new weapon 
was added to banned list.116   The reasoning of the Court provides some 
basis for thinking that the California assault weapons statute might serve as 
a useful model for other statutes seeking to regulate an actively evolving 
subject matter, while preserving the requirement of fair notice to the 
citizenry.  
C. Economy
Although those closest to the issue might be inclined to think 
otherwise, dealing with the Stockton shooting was not the only problem 
facing the California legislature in 1989, nor was defining "assault  
weapons" the only task involving categorization.  No doubt lawmakers 
might have crafted a more nearly ideal statute, perhaps by employing the 
same expert resources Kasler employed in challenging the law.  As the 
Court of Appeal opinion revealed, there were clearly gaps in legislative  
knowledge about firearms.  But it is also the case, as the California Supreme 
Court noted, "[t]he perfect can be the enemy of the good."117   The 
legislature inevitably must decide how to allocate the various limited 
resources at its disposal,  including the waking hours of legislators and their  
staffs.   An hour spent refining the category of "assault weapons" is an hour 
unavailable for other purposes.  Moreover,  every hour spent in the effort  
likely does not produce equal returns in terms of precision.  It is more likely 
that as the effort to achieve ideal precision is approached, more marginal 
effort is required to make improvements.  Moreover, it is not merely 
legislators whose time is at issue.   As other scholars have noted, "rules" may 
consume more legislative time than "standards," but demand less judicial or 
administrative time at the point of application.   Louis Kaplow has 
suggested a framework for taking account of the costs and benefits at all 
stages of legal regulation of varying degrees of rule precision.118
Put in more general terms, utilizing the framework set out above, 
with a given set of technological and linguistic resources, increasing the 
115 Kasler v. Lungren, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1253, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270-71.
116 Kasler v. Lockyer, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
117 Id. at 344.
118 Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 150 (1995). 
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area under the statutory ROC curve for a single statute requires expending 
more legislative resources as reflected in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
The Costs of Legislative Precision
As is also indicated in Figure 3, the relationship between legislative 
resources and the precision with which a legislative category can be 
specified may change if the available level of understanding about the 
subject of the categorization increases.   Consider, for example, the 
challenges facing legislatures seeking to ban possession of certain plant 
material before and after the genetic sequence of the plants has been 
determined.  As explained in much greater detail below, the costs of 
statutory precision are affected both by the means by which a legislature 
expresses itself, and limited by the level of theorization in the domain law 
seeks to regulate.
At any particular point in time, however, for a legislature of given 
collective intelligence and access to a given set of categorization 
techniques, the constraint on legislative resources translates into a 
constraint on the total of all the areas under the all the ROC curves for all
the statutes it considers in a given time.   Put more simply, more time spent 
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on assault weapons means fewer interpretive errors in the future with regard 
to assault weapons but more interpretive errors with regard to taxes on 
agricultural products or other subjects.   The decisions with respect to such 
tradeoffs are generally beyond the view of any judge (or citizen) assessing 
the legislative work product with regard to a particular legislative category.
D. Openness
The constraint that generated the most controversy in the assault 
weapons controversies in California was dealing with a changing world in 
which firearms are constantly changing.  Indeed, the reason that the then 
Attorney General and the California Police Chiefs Association preferred a 
generic definition rather than a list was the fear that "manufacturers could 
get around a list merely by renaming a firearm or making simple cosmetic 
changes in the weapon's design."119   Although especially acute in the face 
of an intelligent and highly  motivated set of actors in the regulated realm,  
the problem of openness is universal.  Plus ça change, but not necessarily 
plus ça meme chose.   The more exquisitely and precisely a statute is crafted 
in order to eliminate ambiguity as applied to the current state of affairs, the 
more quickly it will become irrelevant as the world changes.   A United 
States Constitution written with the precision of the Internal Revenue 
Code would have quickly become irrelevant, if not entirely meaningless.
A legislative body must weigh the risks entailed in regulating a 
changing world.  Processes of amendment or administrative interpretation 
can ameliorate but not eliminate the concern with openness.   How great 
those risks are is affected in part by the variability of the domain of 
regulation.  For example, until recently it was relatively easy to identify 
plants and animals subject to import restrictions, because the domain was 
variable on a Darwinian time scale.  If traditional genus and species 
designations were not enough, gene science now provides an unimaginably 
precise way of specifying a species, by reference to a particular genetic 
sequence.  At the same time, however, the same scientific advances now 
allow the engineering of species in a lab in human rather than evolutionary 
time. 
E. Fitness to the Problem
Finally, and perhaps most centrally, is the question of how nearly a 
statute attains legislative objectives, what Colin Diver calls 
119 Id.
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"congruence."120  The nature of those objectives is,  of course, a 
political matter, external to technical considerations.  And objectives are 
often conflicting.  A legislature wanting to limit the availability of weapons 
that can be used to kill a  large number of people in a short time will 
certainly want to consider restrictions on semiautomatic shotguns, which 
can fire hundreds of lethal pellets in a matter of seconds.  The same 
legislature, however, operates in a world in which semiautomatic shotguns 
are used by law abiding citizens to hunt ducks and obliterate clay pigeons.  
Further, a legislature may reasonably have objectives that extend beyond 
the purely instrumental regulation of objects to, and including, affective 
social norms and the culture.    As noted previously, there are cultural 
reasons that weapons of a certain style and appearance are viewed 
differently by criminals, by some mentally disordered persons, and by 
ordinary citizens and legislators, entirely apart from technical details of how 
much harm they can cause to human flesh.  Weapons themselves have 
semantic content as well as operational capacity; they "mean" something 
different to different people and within different interpretive communities.
V. THE MACHINERY AT HAND:   CATEGORIZATION AND 
HUMAN COGNITION
Unspoken in the discussion thus far is the one overarching, inevitable, 
universal constraint on legislation:  the constraint  of human cognition.   
What matters to legal outcomes is not how categories are specified on 
paper, but how they are understood  in the  minds of people -- especially 
judges but also individual citizens -- who must make decisions based on 
categories.    Obviously, the enterprise of decoding the meaning of 
categorical  specifications is deeply embedded in both general culture121
and distinct subcultures of groups and professions.  But even more 
obviously, all people have roughly the same basic cognitive apparatus with 
which to engage the task of making sense of categories.  Understanding the 
possibilities and limits of legislative categorization therefore requires some 
understanding of categorization at the level of human cognition.  
120 Diver, supra note 87 at 67.
121 Recent work suggests significant variations in categorization (and other basic 
psychological processes) in people in different cultures.  For an accessible survey (as well as some 
more controversial speculations), see RICHARD NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY...AND WHY 
(2003).  
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Legislatures and judges generally proceed on implicit theory of 
cognition that has remained unchanged since Aristotle.  In the past two 
decades, however, cognitive scientists have made important progress in 
understanding categorization as a psychological phenomenon. With some
significant exceptions, these scientific advances have generally been 
ignored by law and legal scholarship generally, especially as they pertain to 
the problem of legislative categories.    After presenting a brief summary of 
the cognitive science of categorization, I will suggest some ways in which 
legislatures might take account of what we now know about how categories 
are processed in the human mind.  I will also suggest that interpretivist 
theorists must now take account of the same science.
A.   Classical and Folk Theories of Categorization
In most areas of human knowledge, there are both folk and expert 
theories.  “Folk theories” are those theories held by most people  in the  
culture who lack  special training,   For example, most  people without 
formal training in physics have a "folk theory" of momentum that predicts 
the course of  a stone on the end of a string swung around in a circle and 
then released.  The folk theoretic prediction is that the stone will follow a 
curved path, as if the stone possesses a kind of dispositional momentum.122
In physics, as in many other areas of knowledge, contemporary folk theories 
bear a remarkable resemblance to Aristotelian theories.123
Untrained people (including legislators and judges) also generally have 
an Aristotelian theory of categorization.124  If we ask the average person to 
define or describe a "chair," we are likely to get back a list of necessary and 
sufficient features, the dominant “folk theory” of concepts and 
categories.125  If a dispute arises about the "chairness" of a particular 
object, we may turn to a dictionary which operationalizes folk theory, 
definitions typically being lists of defining features.  But, as shown most 
122 In fact, of course, the stone will follow a straight path, the direction of which is 
determined by the vector sum of the forces operating on the stone at the moment of its release.
123 See, e.g., A. DiSessa, “Unlearning Aristotelian Physics: a Study of Knowledge-Based 
Learning,” COGNITIVE SCI. 6, 37-75 (1982).
124 Aristotle’s category theories, along with the rest of his body of work, are available on the 
World Wide Web at http://www.mit.edu/classics/Aristotle/categories.1.1.html.
125 “People apparently have a strongly held belief that there are defining attributes for 
categories, in spite of the failure of psychologists, linguists and philosophers to find any.”  Gregory 
L. Murphy and Douglas L. Medin, The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, 92 
PSYCHOL. REV. 289, 311 (1985).
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famously by Wittgenstein,126 many concepts people actually use 
(e.g., "game"), seem to have no defining features.
As philosophers now recognize, it is  impossible, at least outside the 
realm of mathematics,  to specify the defining features of a natural concept 
or category in a way that satisfactorily classifies all cases we might 
encounter.  The philosophical critique is, however, essentially ignored  by 
legislators.   Most statutes begin with a set of definitions, a list  of  features 
that specify the objects  and circumstances  to which the statute  is  
intended  to apply.   Definitions themselves contain  words that must be 
defined.  Thus "assault weapons" is defined with reference to "firearms," 
which must in turn be defined.  But for every problem we solve, we create 
another, because the features and definitions we use  are not themselves 
primitives and must each therefore be defined.  "Firearms" are defined with 
reference to "combustion," which is both somewhat ambiguous and 
undefined in the statutes.  As the list of features and definitions expands, it 
is by no means clear that uncertainty about the classification of future 
instances will be reduced. And as a practical matter, the definitional regress 
must stop, leaving undefined primitives that are themselves subject to 
varying interpretations.
The length and complexity of the description of the category is not 
entirely a matter of choice, however.  Some categories are easier to describe 
than others. In mathematics, the "Kolmogorov complexity" of a 
mathematical object is the length of the shortest computer  program  
required  to generate that object.127   Objects of apparently infinite 
complexity, like the Mandelbrot set, may have quite low Kolmogorov 
complexity and vice versa.128 We might think  of the "Kolmogorov 
complexity" of legislative categories as the  shortest  set  of definitions  that  
will  serve to reliably classify most  situations that actually arise  over  time, 
given the same amount of interpretive effort on the "receiving" end of law.  
Thus, the Kolmogorov complexity of "official holiday" or "adequate 
heat" is plainly less than that of "assault weapons."  By comparison, the 
126 LUDWIG  WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, 1953.   More 
recent and only slightly less definitive work on this topic is SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND 
NECESSITY (Harvard University Press, 1972) and Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of “Meaning”, 
in LANGUAGE, MIND AND KNOWLEDGE: MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol. 7, (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975).
127 For an introduction to Kolmogorov complexity theory as applied to categorization, see 
Ulrike Hahn & Nick Carter, Concepts and Similarity, in KNOWLEDGE, CONCEPTS AND 
CATEGORIES 73, (Koen Lambaste & David Shanks eds., 1997).
128 As represented graphically, the Mandelbrot set is the best known of fractal images.  
Although it appears infinitely complex, and equally complex at all scales of magnification, the set 
is precisely defined by a short algorithm.  The algorithm is described, and the set can be explored 
interactively, at http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/julia/explorer.html.  [visited March 6, 2004].   
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Kolmogorov complexity of "pornography" seems truly awesome to 
contemplate, as we shall see below.   Differences in Kolmogorov complexity 
of categories, I shall argue, depends less on the actual complexity of the 
realms of life being categorized and more on whether we have adequate 
theories about the subjects being categorized.  As I shall explain, just as 
algorithms make possible the precise specification of mathematical objects, 
adequate theories make possible the more precise specification of some 
kinds of categories.  
In most of human affairs, however, and certainly in most of the 
domains in which law operates, we do not have adequate theories.  Why do 
people kill?   How do we assess whether a motorist is driving reasonably?  
When is a contract unconscionable?  Although we may occasionally import 
theoretical constructs to help answer such questions, in the main our 
assessments of the relevant categories -- murder/manslaughter, 
negligence/recklessness,  enforceable/unconscionable -- must be made by 
other means.   In most of law as in most of human affairs, we can only 
utilize those categorization processes that our ancestors evolved long before 
the first law was spoken or written down.  But we now know a great deal 
more about those processes, as I describe in the next section.
B. Cognitive Scientific Theories of  Categorization
Modern cognitive science seeks to replace philosophical speculation 
about concepts and categories with theories about how people actually 
engage in categorization and use categories and concepts; theories that 
generate predictions that can be tested.   The past thirty years have 
produced thousands of articles describing and seeking to explain, not how 
people might develop concepts and categories, but rather how they actually 
do so.129   For example, we know that some categories seem to have a 
“radial” structure, in which some members are more “central” – more 
commonly and more quickly adjudged to belong to the category.  People 
and dictionaries can agree on the meaning of a category like "bird."  The 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., offers "[a]ny feathered vertebrate 
129 This is not an exaggeration.  The PsycINFO database now (March 6, 2004) contains 
5560 articles with "categorization" as a subject or title term.   I do not hesitate to add that I have 
read but a small fraction of these articles and add the following caveat:  One traverses 
interdisciplinary boundaries only at the risks of both misunderstanding and being misunderstood.  
As a law professor,  I have often read with some pain the efforts of social work professors or 
psychiatrists to explain legal principles.   Part of the pain comes from knowing that my own work 
in their worlds may seem as ill-informed, or simply wrong.    But one does the best one can, trying 
to make preliminary judgments as between contesting schools of thought that seem as driven by 
inconsequential difference as the minor sectarian parties of a foreign country.   
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animal, . . . : distinguished by their warm blood, feathers, and 
adaptation of the fore limbs as wings, with which most species fly in the 
air."   But people do not assess creatures having all these features as being 
equivalently "birdlike."  If we ask North Americans to list all the birds they 
can think of, most will list robins or sparrows more often than either eagles 
or penguins.  If we flash pictures of creatures on a screen and ask North 
Americans to press a key indicating whether the creature is a bird or not, 
we can determine that it takes subjects less time to classify a robin than an 
eagle or penguin.130   As reflected in human behavior, at least in the 
context of some kinds of categories, some members of the category are more 
typical than others, a result that is not accounted for by classical theories.
   In the past twenty years, the early work of Kay, Rosch and Rips that 
demonstrated that people do not have an Aristotelian response to 
categories has been extended by dozens of further and more refined 
experiments and more elaborated theories with no single, coherent theory 
yet achieving dominance.   Indeed, the search for a single theory to account 
for how people categorize has recently been modified by the increasing 
evidence that categorization is, to some extent at least, a domain-specific
function.  For example, the same theory that accounts for how we 
categorize birds may not account for how we categorize inanimate 
objects.131   Utilizing technologies that reveal the activation patterns in 
the living human brain (Positron Emission Tomography or PET and 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging for fMRI), in just the past few 
years scientists have been able to determine that categorization of different 
kinds appears to be localized in different regions of the brain.  These 
neuroimaging studies have determined, for example, that the categorization 
of animals and of tools takes place in different regions of the brain.132
Similar studies suggest that rule-based categorization and similarity based 
categorization are associated with quite different regions of the brain.133
Studies like these have cast some doubt on the value of energy spent 
debating the relative merits of candidates for "the" theory of categorization, 
130 Barbara C. Malt & Edward E. Smith, Correlated Properties in Natural Categories, 23 J. 
VERBAL LEARNING & BEHAVIOR 250.
131 For a general survey of this question, see Douglas L. Medin et al., Are There Kinds of 
Concepts?, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 121 (2000).
132 Michael A. Kraut et al., Neural Activation during an Explicit Categorization Task:  
Category- or Feature- Specific Effects, 13 COG. BRAIN RES.  213 (2002) [summarizing research 
in this area but also suggesting that differences may be accounted for by activation of the 
sensorimotor/cognitive systems in the case of tools -- in other words, when we think of tools we 
also think of using tools.  Id at 220].  See also Edward E. Smith et al., Alternative Strategies of 
Categorization, 65 COGNITION 167 (1998).
133 Murray Grossman et al., The Neural Basis for Categorization in Semantic Memory, 17 
NEUROIMAGE 1549 (2002).
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as well as on the possibility of setting out a complete account of those 
debates in a law review article.  For our purposes, however, it may be useful 
to at least consider what were considered, until recently at least, the three 
leading contenders for a general theory of categorization:  prototype 
theories, exemplar theories and theory-theories.134  My point in briefly 
describing these theories here is not to argue for the general validity of any 
of them, but to sketch them in enough detail to suggest their implications 
for legislative categorization.  
1. Prototype Theories
Law is often spawned by prototypes, by the reaction to particular 
events taken to represent entire classes of possible events.   Willie Horton 
comes to stand for all dangerous parolees.   “Willie Hortonizing” comes to 
stand for the process of  attaching a particularly unpleasant prototype to a 
politician in the public mind.  Lucy Williams has written compellingly of 
how one abusive mother who happened to be on welfare became the “poster 
child” for draconian welfare “reform” in Massachusetts.135    The very 
notion of “poster child” is itself prototypical, taken from the phenomenon of 
using particular victims of a disease to represent all victims.  When 
commentators speak of the purpose of The War Powers Act as being  
intended to prevent “another Vietnam,” nearly everyone understands the 
reference.   That laws are animated by prototypes does not mean, of course, 
that they are best expressed by reference to prototypes, but the role of 
prototypicality in the origin of laws bears keeping in mind.
In cognitive science, prototype theories posit that concepts and 
categories are represented in the mind by reference to an idealized 
representation of the concept or category.    The prototype is a mental 
134 I do not include Lakoff's "idealized cognitive model" theory primarily because it has not 
been taken seriously as a theory within cognitive science, as indicated in footnote 31.  I do not 
share with Steven Winter the view that Lakoff's theory is superior to the competition because "it 
provides more general, overarching abstraction capable of accommodating the many different
forms of categorical and conceptual structure identified in the literature" or because "it provides a 
more supple theoretical tool that better explains the complexities of radial categories."   
STEPHEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 88 (2001) 
One of the problems with the ICM theory is that it is too "supple" and too much "a general, 
overarching abstraction."  The same features that make Lakoff's theory appealing in trying to 
explain categorization to an audience of law professors make it less than appealing as a scientific 
theory, primarily because it is not sufficiently articulated to generate predictions that can be tested 
as again, for example, the predictions generated by the more standard scientific theories of human 
categorization.  Indeed, at some point, it becomes difficult to distinguish an ICM from an "idea," 
except that all ICM's seem to have the feature of "radialness" in the sense of "radial category."
135 Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers:  How Media Discourse Informs 
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159  (1995)
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representation similar to Kant’s notion of  the schema136 for,  e.g., 
triangles, which is different from  any  particular example of a triangle.   
New cases are evaluated in terms of their similarity to the prototype.   Thus, 
we can ask a sample of people within a particular culture to rate examples of 
birds or fruit as being “typical” of those categories on a 7-point scale, from 
least to most typical, as indicated in Table 2   People can do this 
notwithstanding that it might be extraordinarily difficult for them to 
articulate what "typicality" means in this instance.  At least as forced into 
this one-dimensional scale, there is a degree of “birdness” or "fruitness" 
about which most people agree, although there is no perfectly prototypical 
bird or fruit.  
Table 2
Sample Typicality Ratings for “Fruit” And “Bird”137
Fruit Rating Bird Rating
Apple 6.25 Robin 6.89
Pear 5.25 Seagull 6.26
Strawberry 5.00 Falcon 5.74
Blueberry 4.56 Mockingbird 5.47
Fig 3.38 Sandpiper 4.47
Pumpkin 2.31 Penguin 2.63
We can also construct a higher dimensional measure of prototypes 
by asking people to rate the similarity between pairs of members of a 
category and between members and the category itself, and then mapping 
the results, as in Figure 4.  Thus, in Figure 4, an apple is closer to the 
category “fruit” than is a blueberry, but  the prototype itself does not occupy 
a space coextensive with any particular example of a fruit.   Another way of 
describing a prototype is that it is "an exemplar with average values on all 
136 In THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON Kant wrote:  
"In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure 
sensuous conceptions.  No image could ever be adequate to our conception of triangles in general.  For 
the generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, 
whether right-angled, acute angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of 
this sphere.  The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule 
of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space."  [quoted in PHILIP N. 
JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS 189-90 (1983).]
137 From Malt & Smith, supra note 129, reprinted in Edward E. Smith, Categorization, in
THINKING: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 44 (Daniel N. Osherson & 
Edward E. Smith eds., 1990).
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the dimensions along  which the category's exemplars vary".138  However 
described, these examples demonstrate the defining feature, if you will, of 
prototype theory:  what is stored in memory as representing the concept is 
the abstracted prototype itself, rather than all the exemplars from which it 
may be derived.   In some cases there will exist an exemplar that is the same 
as the prototype, but this need not be the case.
Figure 4
The Similarity Space for “Fruit”139
As is described in more detail below, prototype theory has fallen out 
of favor among cognitive scientists as a general account of categorization 
because of its failure to account for several observed aspects of human 
cognition.  For the moment, however, let us examine how prototype theory 
might inform legislative drafting.   We can begin with some of the examples 
from the experiments described above.  Suppose we want to ban the 
importation of  “fruit” from a particular country, in a way that goes beyond 
listing known species of plants.   One way for a legislature to define what it 
138 Stephen Dopkins & Theresa Gleason, Comparing Exemplar and Prototype Models of 
Categorization, 51 CANADIAN J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 212, 213 (1997).
139 From Amos Tversky and J. W. Hutchinson, Nearest Neighbor Analysis of Psychological 
Spaces, 93 PSYCHOL. REV.  3 (1986), reprinted in Smith, supra note 136 at 39.
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means by “fruit” would be to attach something like Figure 4 to the 
statute, indicating that “fruit” means any object at least as “fruitlike” as a 
coconut as measured by some specified distance in the similarity space. 
Alternatively, the statute might specify the experimental conditions that 
produce a metric scale like that in Table 2 above, and define a “fruit” as an 
object with a typicality rating above 3.0.  Of course, what is “fruitlike
There is no obvious reason why the same methods could not be used 
to specify the meaning of a category like “assault weapon.”    Experiments 
and surveys might indicate that the AK-47 assault rifle is closest to the 
prototype of “assault weapon,” just as the apple is closest to the “fruit” 
prototype.  The California legislature might have defined the "prototypical
assault weapon"  as the AK-47 assault rifle, and then given the same list of 
banned weapons, but  with an additional feature:  an attached set of numbers 
specifying typicality ratings for each example.   These numbers might be 
determined by surveys or experiments with any set of people:  the members 
of the legislature itself, or a sample chosen by other means.   Prototype 
theory suggests that there need not in fact be any instance of the prototype.  
The AK-47 may be closest to the prototype of all existing assault weapons, 
but it need not be coextensive with the prototype.140
Pornography would appear to pose a much more difficult problem.   
To begin, we cannot produce a relatively complete set of candidate members 
of the category -- as with fruits or assault weapons -- because there are an 
infinite number of  possible candidate images.    Whether we could get 
substantial inter-rater  reliability in judgments of  "pornographicality" -- as 
among legislators or  others -- is an empirical question.  I would guess not, 
even if we used a carefully selected, culturally and sexually homogenous 
group.    But again, this is for now a matter of cultural judgment rather than 
empirical assessment.
The notion of prototypicality, particularly as expressed in the spatial 
metaphor of "radial categories," also turns out to be more complicated than 
first appears.  "Typicality" may mean different things in different contexts.  
First, we can use "typicality" to describe the extent to which objects are 
"good examples" of  the category.  To use an example from Osherson and 
140 For the sake of simplicity and space, I gloss over here the rather important notion that 
the "typicality" metric cannot be easily specified in a single number.   Operationally, we might 
glean such numbers from a survey, but the answers to the survey might conceal the fact that a 
typicality metric is an implicit sum of metrics as to many different features:  one person may give a 
Blodgett 47 rifle a .8 typicality rating because of the caliber and barrel length, while another 
person gives the same rating because of the color of the stock and the name of the gun.    
Cognitive scientists have also found significant differences in how  people learn categories  with 
"linearly separable" vs. "non-linearly separable" (significantly intercorrelated) features.
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Smith,141 we may agree that both the biggest selling chair from  the IKEA 
chain and Queen Elizabeth's throne are both chairs, but certainly the IKEA 
chairs is more  "typical" a chair in this sense.   A second, but distinct aspect 
of  typicality relates to the perceived degree to which a candidate example 
"belongs"  to the category -- the "gradient of membership."  Both the 
Queen's throne and the IKEA chair are, without question, chairs.   But what 
of a three-legged  stool, a bus  bench, or a hassock?   We can experimentally 
determine that people in the same culture have roughly the same take, 
expressed roughly thus:  the IKEA chair may be a 100% (1.0) chair, but the 
three legged stool only a 0.7 chair.    The difference we can describe as the 
category membership function.    Surveys and reaction time experiments 
may produce single numbers for "chairness" of candidate objects, but  
already we begin to see that the single metric may conceal differences in 
typicality and category membership.
Recent work by cognitive scientists on conceptual coherence 
suggests there is often an even more fine-grained internal structure to 
concepts and categories.142  One method of assessing the internal structure 
of a concept rests on measuring "mutability," the degree to which people 
judge that the concept or category remains the same even as the feature in 
question changes.  Mutability can be measured by four tests:  surprise, ease-
of-imagining, goodness of example, and similarity-to-an-ideal.   "Surprise" 
is measured by asking subjects how surprised they would be to encounter a
transformed instance:  e.g., an apple that did not grow on trees, an assault 
weapon made of plastic, or pornography that does not depict the human 
genital region.  "Ease-of-imagining" is measured by asking people to judge 
how easily they can imagine an instance of the category without the feature.  
"Goodness of example" is measured by asking how good an example  of the 
category they judge an object without the feature to be: e.g., "How good an 
example of an apple is an apple that does not grow on trees?".   The 
"similarity to the ideal" is obtained  by asking subjects, e.g., "how similar is 
an apple  that  does not grow on trees to an ideal apple?"   By these means, 
the dependency relations between features of the concept or category can be 
described as in Figure 5 below.  These experiments suggest that the 
"central" features of a concept, those that are the least mutable, are those 
upon which most other features in turn depend.    The same experiments 
suggest the existence of, and means of ascertaining, the parts and aspects of 
concepts that have their own dependency structures, as in the two 
141 Daniel Osherson & Edward E. Smith, On Typicality and Vagueness, 64 COGNITION
189, 189 (1997).  
142 Stephen A. Sloman et al., Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence, 22 
COGNITIVE SCI. 189 (1998).  
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subnetworks of Figure III below that pertain to the reproductive and 
the food-related features of  apples.
Figure 5143
The Conceptual Structure of "Apple"
How might these theories and technologies of assessment be used in 
drafting legislation?    Consider first whether information as represented in 
Figure 5 about "apples" would be helpful to a judge or administrative 
143 Id. at 205.  Arrows point from a feature to one that it depends on.  "Ease of imagining" 
judgments obtained in experiments are shown beside each category-feature.
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agency charged with determining whether a new, genetically engineered 
fruit is an "apple" for purposes of a statute regulating agriculture.   The 
answer is almost certainly affirmative:   There is certainly information in 
Figure 5, or other representations of the same  kinds of assessments of  
meaning, that is not present in the category label standing alone.   We know 
from the words of assault weapons legislation that features like handgrips 
and flash suppressors matter, but we do not know how much they matter (or, 
as we shall  see,  why).   Revealing the internal structure  of feature 
interdependence conveys information on this point (even before we 
understand why some features matter more than others).
Thus, at least in principle, a legislative analyst charged with 
reducing legislative action to statutory language might use these methods to 
get at what legislators mean by "assault weapons," producing a chart like 
Figure 5 as part of the legislative history of the statute.   A judge asked to 
decide whether a new weapon should be added to the list of "assault 
weapons" might make use of such information as significant, perhaps even 
the best, evidence of legislative intentions.
2. Exemplar Theories
Prototype theory has strong intuitive appeal.   Unfortunately, as a 
general theory of how people learn and use categories and concepts, 
prototype theory  now appears to be inadequate in many respects.144  First, 
prototype theories treat concepts as context-independent. But experiments 
demonstrate the opposite.  For example, asked to rate the typicality of 
various “beverages at breaktime,” people give a different ordering depending 
on whether the people taking the break are secretaries or truck drivers.145
Further, prototype theory suggests certain results when concepts are 
combined.  For example, people think metal spoons are more “spoon-like” 
than wooden spoons, and smaller spoons “spoonier” than larger spoons.   
144 W.K. Estes observes: "It is interesting to note that prototype theory is by far the most 
visible variety in the literature, although it can be credited with none of the close quantitative 
accounts of categorization data that have appeared during the last decade, the majority of which 
have been achieved by exemplar-similarity models.  The  popularity of prototype theory appears to
derive from a combination of factors -- its intuitive appeal, its long history, and some results of 
experiments employing categories of objects ((typically irregular polygons or dot patterns)) 
produced by means of variations on experimenter-defined prototypes.  W.K. Estes, Models of 
Categorization, in 29 CATEGORIZATION BY HUMANS AND MACHINES 15 (Glenn V. 
Nakamura et al. eds., 1993) [citations omitted]. 
144 Emilie M. Roth & Edward J. Shoben, The Effect of Context on the Structure of 
Categories," 15 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 346 (1983).
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But people judge large wood spoons more typical than small wooden 
spoons.  In sum, people seem not to do what prototype theory suggests that 
they do:  retain only the abstracted essence, the central tendency,  of the 
concept, discarding irrelevant detail.  It appears that people also take 
account of the interactions among the features of the objects they 
categorize, especially when those features are not, in the observed world, 
independent (or, in the nearly unpronounceable term of cognitive science, 
"non-linearly separable").  In other words, we take notice of the fact that 
wooden spoons tend to be large and metal spoons small. The attraction of 
prototype theory, its parsimoniousness, is surely lost if it predicts that people 
retain prototypes for every combination of features (small metal spoons, 
large wooden spoons, and so on).   Exemplar theory challenges the very 
notion of prototypes, while seeking to account for prototype effects
Exemplar theory is something like prototype theory, only less so.  
That is to say, whereas prototype theory assumes that prototypes are 
extracted and stored separately from the particular category members or 
exemplars with which a subject is familiar, exemplar theory posits that 
subjects directly access traces of multiple exemplars in memory at the 
(later) point at which the categorization of a new instance is  required.   
Categories thus have no independent representation, but are an emergent 
property of the collection of exemplars associated with the category.   Most 
of the recent research suggests that exemplar theory accounts for a wider 
range of phenomena than prototype theory.146   As one recent account 
puts it, "the literature has come to favor instead a generalized exemplar 
principle in categorization."147
Consider again the California legislature’s initial effort at defining 
“assault weapon” by reference to a list of particular weapons.    Exemplar 
theories of categorization operate in the  same way, the category being 
implicitly defined as "these things and others 'like' them":  the category is in 
the examples themselves.  Prototypes, if they exist, are constructed "on the 
fly" and as needed, rather than stored independently in memory.  Exemplar 
theories of categorization are thus entirely congenial to the ancient 
146 For overviews of the literature as well as particularized experimental studies, see Koen 
Lamberts, Exemplar Models and Prototype Effects in Similarity-Based Categorization, 22 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  LEARNING, MEMORY AND COGNITION 1503 (1996); 
Dopkins & Gleason, supra note 137; and GREGORY L. MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF 
CONCEPTS 73-114 (2002), noting the relatively greater strength of the predictive power of 
exemplar theories in experiments, but also noting that prototype theories may be more 
appropriate to natural categories, and that there may be differences in categorization among 
people.  Id at 114.
147 J. David Smith & John Paul Minda, Prototypes in the Mist: The Early Epochs of 
Category Learning, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL:  LEARNING, MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1411 (1998).
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principle of ejusdem generis in statutory interpretation.  This canon of 
construction (translated as "of the same kind") provides that when the 
general description follows a  list  of more specific examples, the general 
words are limited to those similar to those enumerated specifically.  For 
example, in the phrase "automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other 
motor-powered vehicles," "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the 
list was of land-based transportation.148
How might the California legislature have used exemplar theory?  
Rather than assuming that there is a single prototype for a legislative 
category and trying to probe the internal structure of that concept, the 
legislature might attend more directly to real exemplars.  Providing a rather 
extensive list of exemplars seems relatively feasible in the case of "assault 
weapons."  There are books that catalog virtually every kind of weapon
being mass produced.149  A legislative committee could go through the 
catalog and mark those exemplars it would include and those it would not.  
The annotated catalog could be sent forward with the legislation as the 
category.  Moreover, "assault weapons" are not determined only by 
reference to what they are, but in contrast to what they are not:  "sporting 
firearms."   The same firearms catalog could be marked to indicate 
exemplars of sporting firearms,  and clear non-membership in the assault 
weapons category.  Indeed, listing the firearms explicitly not being 
regulated is a method that has been used in federal firearms legislation, 
albeit  possibly more out of concerns for political liability than semantic 
clarity.
How might the exemplar approach be used with legislation concerning 
“pornographic images”?  Here there is no finite list, no catalog, that can be 
categorized by exemplar/non-exemplar status.   A legislature might employ 
a version of Justice Stewart's method to categorize, say, a sample of 1,000 
images taken off the Internet.   Future citizens and judges would be left with 
the prospect of viewing this collection and comparing candidate images 
with the sorted collection.   Not a pleasant prospect, certainly, but it does 
seem that both citizens and judges would have a better idea of what the 
modern Justice Stewart sees when he sees and knows pornography, after he 
has seen it and expressed the state of his knowledge.
In effect,  exemplar theory works in the same way that our common 
law is supposed to work:   categories and concepts evolve out of the 
disposition of particular instances:   in situations A, B and C, we have 
148 From http://dictionary.law.com.
149 The Jane’s Company produces exhaustive paper and on-line catalogues of virtually every 
sort of weapon, including assault weapons.  See e.g., JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS and other 
publications at http://catalogue.janes.com/ [visited March 6, 2004].
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instances  of "gross negligence," whereas in situations X, Y and Z we 
do not.    Although a court may say what it thinks are the principles
underlying its decisions, what is supposed to matter is what the court 
actually does in a particular case.    Subsequent cases are to be decided 
based upon their "similarity" to the decided exemplars in the reported cases. 
Of course, critical analysis quickly reveals that "similarity" is not an 
unproblematic concept.  As Nelson Goodman most famously demonstrated, 
one cannot say with precision whether even two things are similar without 
specifying the “respects” in which they are similar.150   Like any two 
objects, any two cases are "similar" in a potentially  infinite number of 
respects:  whether the claim arose  on a Tuesday, is prosecuted by a 
Christian, involves animals, and so on.   A legislature cannot merely 
provide a list of exemplars and be certain that future judges will extract the 
correct dimensions of similarity from the infinitely many possible 
dimensions.   For example, if all the examples of assault weapons have 
barrels longer than 6 inches and wooden stocks, future judges may assess 
these as important (indeed, universal) features of the legislated category, 
even though legislators may well have banned sawed-off assault weapons 
with plastic stocks as well, if the possibility had occurred to them.   This 
logic councils the legislature drafting exemplar-based laws to include as 
many exemplars as possible, including exemplars that vary as much as 
possible on the non-significant dimensions, and to include exemplars that 
are outside the intended category.   Deciding which exemplars to use, 
which features to mention, seems more like an art, however, than the 
science this article promises.  Perhaps we can move a bit more toward the 
scientific, or at least scientistic, by looking at how exemplar-based 
categories could be represented in connectionist representations of 
categories or concepts.
3. Prototypes, Exemplars and Neural Networks 
I begin with a brief account of a neural network, the basic architecture 
of what are called “connectionist” models of cognition.    In neural 
networks, information is representable not in the form of symbols, rules or 
statements, but in the pattern and strength of the connections between 
simple processing units modeled on biological neurons. As in the biological 
brain, each simulated neuron is a processing unit with an input and output 
side.  The strength of the signal on the output side is a function of all of the 
signals on the input side.  The outputs of some neurons are connected to 
150 Nelson Goodman, Seven Strictures on Similarity, in PROBLEMS AND PROJECTS
(Nelson Goodman ed., 1972).
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the inputs of other neurons.  The simplest functioning neural network 
consists of three layers of neurons:  an input layer, an output layer, and a 
hidden layer, organized as indicated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6
A Simple  Neural Network
Neural networks can be "trained" to categorize as follows:    Each 
input neuron is set according to one feature of the object.    Each output 
neuron is associated with one or another category.   The network is then 
"trained" on a large number of examples -- the "training set."   As each 
example is presented, input neurons are set to match the features of the 
exemplar. The connection weights are initially set at random and the 
network initially produces a "guess" at the correct categorization of the 
exemplar.  A "training" supervisor then indicates whether that 
categorization is correct.   With each iteration, the connection weights are 
adjusted to lessen the difference between the "guess" and the correct output, 
as supplied by  the supervisor.  By this seemingly simple process, neural 
networks possess quite extraordinary capabilities in recognizing complex, 
subtle patterns, including information in schematic form, and to learn very 
subtle differences that may distinguish members of one category from 
members of another. The "knowledge" that permits the neural network to 
so perform is not contained in any list of descriptions, statements, or 
propositions.  It is entirely contained in the vector of connection weights 
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between neurons in the network.   The source of this "knowledge" is, of 
course, the supervisor or trainer of the network.  The value of the neural 
network approach is that the trainer need not specify a rule explaining why 
a particular object belongs in one category or another.  The network will 
"learn" whatever implicit rule the trainer is using, whether the trainer can 
state it explicitly or not.  The trainer need only, with Justice Potter, "know 
it when he sees it."
Is the neural network model a prototype theory or an exemplar 
theory?  The answer is both.  The network will display prototype effects, 
more confidently classifying objects that approximate a prototype, but the 
ability of the network to do so is based entirely on training over a set of 
exemplars.  The neural network behaves as if it is calculating the difference 
between a sample object and a stored prototype, and as if it was doing so on 
the basis of information extracted from exemplars. 
Applying connectionist implementation of exemplar theory to the 
problem of legislative categorization might yield something like the 
following:  First, a network is constructed to have only two output neurons, 
consistent with (a) “assault weapons” and (b) all other objects, as in Figure 
6.   Second, the “exemplars” are found among the examples of the training 
set.  In order to be useful, the training set must include both members and 
non-members of the category:  single shot pistols as well as AK-47's; guns 
with pink stocks as well as brown.151 Third, the architect of the network 
must specify which features of the exemplars are to be associated with 
particular inputs to the input neurons:   barrel length, caliber, bullet weight, 
speed of reloading and discharge, and so on.  Fourth, the network must be 
“trained” by a supervisor, someone able to provide feedback to the network 
when it assesses that a particular object is, or is not, within the category.    
The supervisor need not be aware of any particular rules for determining 
category membership.  Rather, like Justice Stewart, the trainer must know 
an assault weapon when he sees one.  At the end of this process, the 
network will have an ability to categorize new candidate objects, an ability 
that approaches asymptotically that of the trainer.
In our thought experiment, both the architect and the training 
supervisor of the network would be the legislature itself.   Having 
determined which features should be attended to, the legislature would then 
151 The training set is crucial.  A possibly apocryphal story has an early military target 
recognition network trained to distinguish Soviet-bloc tanks from those used by NATO forces.  
The training set consisted of hundreds of photographs.  Because of the difference in the difficulty 
of acquiring pictures of the two categories of tanks, most of the Soviet-bloc tank pictures were of 
tanks under trees and in the shadows.  The neural network learned to associate shadows with 
things Soviet, such that a US tank under a tree was classified by the network as potentially 
hostile. 
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consider a substantial list of exemplars as a training set.  Feedback 
would be presented to the network as to whether each of the exemplars was, 
or was not, a member of the category.  At the end of this training, the 
specification of the category would be in the network itself, in the 
connection weights produced by the training.   This network structure and 
vector of connection weights would BE the category definition.  Just as the 
voice recognition and OCR programs on my computer can recognize both 
the sight and sound of the letter "A" without having any set of rules for 
distinguishing "A" from "H," a statute banning “assault weapons” might 
come with an appended neural network, trained by the legislators at the 
time the legislation was passed.   In some senses, this is probably as close as 
one can get to excavating with precision what legislators actually meant in 
using a term like “assault weapons.” 
Such an enterprise might be helpful to the Attorney General and 
judges called upon to classify new weapons.   But, because the "meaning" of 
the category is embedded  in the weights of the network, to ordinary 
citizens lacking access to the network, the results would be entirely opaque 
and unconstitutionally vague, at least until a judge has ruled on a  particular 
candidate firearm.   Even if this concern were met (by making the network 
available  on the internet,  for example), it is unrealistic to suppose that a 
legislature would engage in the tedious process of training a neural network 
on a set of possible exemplars of each of the categories the legislature 
intends to define.  In the face of all that modern science can offer, Aristotle 
begins to seem a more reasonable choice.
But neural network computer programs are not the only means by 
which a legislature acting on the basis of exemplar theories of categorization 
might legislate.   The legislature might simply include a list of exemplars 
and near-miss excluded cases.  A legislature can then hope that judges will 
detect the same similarities in the exemplars that they detect, aided by a 
large and well-crafted list of exemplars.   Or legislators can specify the 
features or "respects" in which the exemplars are similar and reflect the 
category being specified.  The legislature might additionally indicate which 
of the exemplars are particularly good examples of the intended category.   
The “goodness of example” measure might be made based on votes as to 
particular exemplars:  exemplars at the categorical margin would be 
expected to draw closer votes. 
4. CATegorization in Context
Thus far, we have taken the categorization task as one that can be 
performed without much reference to context.  At least in the context of 
68
objects, it would seem that we do not need context:  we are likely to regard 
an object as being an assault weapon without regard to the day of the week,
the gender of the owner, or any other fact extern to the object itself.  In 
many cases, however, we cannot categorize without context.  
To continue the neural network analog, consider a simple neural 
network designed to "read" marks on paper:  an optical  character 
recognition program charged only with classifying handwritten marks as 
either the letter "A"  or the letter "H" -- a task performed readily performed 
by such programs on Palm Pilots and other "Personal Digital Assistants."  
The "features" of the marks might be whether the mark touches squares 
(pixels) on a predefined grid, as in Figure 7, or by characteristics defined by 
other means, like the angle between the two "legs" of the character. 
Figure 7  
A Pixel Grid for Letter Recognition
 Each character presented to an input device like that reflected in 
Figure 7 will generate a vector of numbers.  The neural network will process 
those input numbers and generate a "guess" as to whether the character is 
an A or an H.  The trainer of the network will provide feedback to the 
network indicating whether the guess is correct or incorrect.  As the 
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network is trained on hundreds of examples of different characters, in 
different fonts, shapes and sizes, its accuracy will improve.  Which is not to 
say that it will ever become perfect.   Nor can it learn to do things its 
trainer cannot do, such as resolving the ambiguity of the middle figure in 
Figure 7.
As in the case of "river banks" and "banks with money in them," 
ambiguity can sometimes be resolved by introducing additional constraints 
from the context of usage.  Consider the same ambiguous middle character 
in Figure 7, in the context of the usage in Figure 8.    
Figure 8
Disambiguation through Context
We effortlessly assign the very same object to different categories, 
depending entirely on the context.  
How might the constraints supplied by context help disambiguate 
an object potentially classifiable as an "assault weapon"?   Consider the guns 
used in some carnival games, in which customers fire pellets at mechanical 
targets.   The guns are typically affixed to the game booth in such a way 
that they cannot be aimed at anything other than the target area.   Many of 
them are automatic weapons, in the sense that they fire multiple shots with 
one pull of the trigger.  Some of them might fit within some definitions of 
"assault weapons," particularly if they were detached from the game 
machinery and able to fire at people in the carnival crowd.   Are they 
therefore "assault weapons"?  The context (attached to the game machinery 
or not) might supply the answer, even if the legislature had never thought 
to consider whether to include them.  
5. Theory-Theories
Some categories seem to depend almost entirely on context.    Both 
prototype theories and exemplar theories have a certain surface plausibility 
in the context of categories like “fruit,” “bird,” or “assault weapon.”  But 
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consider the following members of an as-yet unidentified category:  cats, 
insurance policies, birds, deeds, jewelry, photographs, dogs, bonds, children, 
original paintings and passports.   No obvious prototype can be extracted 
from such a list.   The list of exemplars provides no clear way to determine 
whether, for example, “cash” or "cheap reproductions of paintings" belong
to the list.    However, things become clearer when we are told that these 
are “things to take out of one’s home in the event of a fire”.   Suppose in 
such a moment of crisis, as one quickly collects possessions as the smoke 
thickens, a roommate calls out, "Take the cat."   Does she mean the tabby 
recently liberated from the pound, or the Magritte painting of a tabby 
inherited from the Dadaist grandfather?  The answer might depend on 
whether the painting is a reproduction, as well as on the presumed values of 
the roommate.
Or, consider the working title of this piece.  What do "lawyers, guns 
and money" have in common, other than as "things to send to an 
adventurer in distress"?152  The category is incoherent absent an 
explanatory theory in which the items are similar-in-context (things that 
are highly valued, difficult to replace and more easily moved).   Or, to 
consider a perhaps more legally realistic though remotely analogous 
example, consider the following list of animals:  a gray bat, a black-footed 
ferret, a giant panda, and a jaguar.   We cannot examine a collection of 
specimens of these animals and induce a particular category to which they 
belong, in part because they belong to infinitely many:  (mammals, not-
very-colorful animals, animals that attract fleas, etc.).    What gives the 
category coherence in this case is external to the exemplars themselves:  
these animals are listed by the Environmental Protection Agency as 
endangered species.153    They are reasonably linked only because these are 
species that have not fared well in particular ecological settings.  These are 
also animals one would choose to save in the event of a local ecological 
catastrophe because, like our papers and mementos, they are hard to 
replace.   But note the difficulty we would have in specifying the features of 
either animals or precious belongings.   Describing a prototype for these 
categories in any systematic way seems equally problematic.154
 The reason is that such categories and concepts make sense only in 
the context of a purpose, theory, explanation or narrative.   Some theorists 
would extend this notion to all categorizations and concepts, arguing that 
152 Zevon, supra note 40.
153 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 CFR §17.11.
154 There are, however, good reasons for advocates to try.  Conservationists will put forward 
whales or other likeable creatures as "poster species" for preservation; opponents will highlight 
kangaroo rats or undistinguished  little fish.
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all categorizations and concepts are embedded in implicit or explicit 
theories about the world. We know, for example, that the centrality of a 
feature in determining category membership is determined in large degree 
by its position within the causal structure of the category.155  Thus, 
"roundness" is perceived as a more central feature of basketballs than of 
cantaloupes.  One explanation for this phenomenon is the differential way 
in which roundness figures into the overall causal relations among features. 
In the case of basketballs, roundness permits predictable bounces and falling 
through round hoops.  A square cantaloupe might nonetheless be sweet, 
juicy, gray-green and contain seeds.156
Whether all categories and concepts are theory-dependent depends 
on one’s theory (or prototype) of  theories in general.    The notion of 
“adequate heat,” so easily operationalized to numbered marks on the linear 
scale of a  thermometer, does not at first seem to be theory-bound.   But, on 
closer inspection, why do we choose 72 degrees in a statute about "adequate 
heat" for residential housing?   People do not experience as equivalent the 
differences between 52, 62, 72, and 82 degrees.  The linearity of the 
temperature scale relates to the physics of heat expansion of materials (e.g., 
mercury), not about anything of direct importance to people.    One also 
suspects that another number might have been chosen at other period of 
history, when clothing conventions were different. What assumptions 
underlay the use of the term “occupied room” or the mandate to measure 
temperature 36 inches above the floor?   Here the underlying, invisible 
assumptions are cultural rather than scientific.  As this example 
demonstrates, even the simplest concept or category rests on a range of  
unstated assumptions and theories about people and the physical world.  
We can disregard the underlying theories with some comfort only because 
the situational assumptions  (e.g., clothing conventions, physiological 
mechanisms) are relatively constant.  And we can specify the category with 
precision because we have an excellent set of theories that enable us to 
measure heat with great precision.
The category of “assault weapons” provides an interesting contrast.   
If we are given exemplars of the weapons listed in the California statute, we 
will notice several common features:    All have barrels.  All fire projectiles 
that are propelled by small explosive charges contained in metal cartridges.  
All have a mechanism that reloads another cartridge automatically when a 
round is fired.    All have a trigger.   Most, but not all, have a shoulder 
stock.   Certainly, the similarities are more readily apparent than was the 
155 Woo-kyoung Ahn et al., Causal Status as a Determinant of Feature Centrality, 41 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 361 (2000).
156 Id. at 365.
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case with the list of animals on the endangered list.    But is there a “theory” 
of assault weapons?   
Possibly.  Most of these weapons have a shoulder stock because of 
the operation of Newton’s Third Law of Motion157  and the fact that these 
weapons fire a moderately heavy bullet at high velocity which results -- by 
the laws of physics -- in a substantial recoil. Such a firearm that did not 
transfer that recoil energy to the more massive parts of the human body 
(i.e., a pistol), might well break the wrist of the shooter. The relative heavy 
bullet and high velocity are, in turn, functions of the design goal of these 
weapons:   to inflict significant damage on human bodies.  The damage a 
projectile causes on impact is a function of its mass and velocity.   In 
addition, these weapons fire many rounds in rapid succession because of the 
design goal that they inflict heavy damage in a short period of time, in order
to reduce the time the soldier using them is exposed to counterfire.  In 
short, the very reason these weapons are called “assault weapons” is that 
they evolved for optimal use in a range of infantry assault situations, with 
the overall design goal of enabling the rapid infliction of lethal injury to as 
many human beings as possible in the shortest possible time.  Viewed in 
this light, the deeper commonality in the exemplars in the California 
statute extends beyond the more obviously similar features, and might 
enable the specification of  “assault weapons” that share virtually none of 
the features of  contemporaneous exemplars. 
A “theory-based” statute banning assault weapons might ban “all 
weapons capable of firing more than a X projectiles with energies greater 
than Y within a period of Z seconds."    Such a statute begins to look more 
like the “heat” statute, and to offer some of the same benefits.  First, merely 
changing the appearance of a weapon no longer removes it from the ban.  
Second, legislative purposes in reducing access to especially lethal  weapons 
seem better accomplished. Finally, such a statute is rather more easily 
communicated, understood and applied by citizens, administrative agencies 
or judges because it contains an operationalized, theory-based test for 
determining category membership.   As with the heat statute, we have 
reduced the meaning of the category to more basic (arguably the most
basic) terms:  mass, velocity, time.   
Note, however, that the "theory" relied upon in this "theory-based" 
statute is a theory in physics.  The political reality (for which we have less 
satisfying theories) is considerably more complex.  One of the challenges of 
drafting a politically viable assault weapons ban is that there are weapons of 
equally terrifying lethality that legislators do not wish to ban, such as the 
157  Newton's Third Law of Motion:  For every action, an equal and opposite reaction.
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semiautomatic shotguns favored by duck hunters.  There is no 
constitutional requirement, however, that legislators adhere to a single 
categorizing device.  The legislature might adopt a "theory-based" category, 
but then explicitly exclude from it what would otherwise be a subcategory:  
semiautomatic shotguns.
Turning to the most difficult case, “pornography," how might a 
theory-based categorization of "pornography" be developed?   We might
begin by looking, as a practical matter, at some of the many reasons
legislatures have for seeking to limit pornography.   Some  of these are 
matters of esthetic preference about what images ought to be displayed in a 
society with aspirations of certain kinds of “decency.”   Others incorporate 
explicit or inchoate theories of human behavior:  that men exposed to 
certain kinds of images will be more inclined to sexual aggression; that 
children will be induced to inappropriately early sexual activity.    Could a 
legislature define "pornography highly likely to induce sexual 
aggression/sexual activity" or “PHLISA”?  This is, at bottom, an empirical 
question.  Legislatures can define "adequate heat" in terms of marks on a 
thermometer because empirically, all thermometers behave  in quite similar 
fashion in the presence of the same temperature.   Legislatures can define 
“assault weapons” in terms of  lethality by implicit reference to the 
underlying physics of how projectiles inflict injury on the human body, safe 
in the assumption that bullets have roughly the same effect on all human 
bodies.  But one can scarcely say the same of the effect of  PHLISA on 
"men."    One could try to operationalize PHLISA in a more refined way, of 
course.    "Men" could be operationalized as "a random sample of men 
between 18-24" or "a sample of recently paroled, historically heterosexual 
sex offenders."  "Sexual activity" could be operationalized by reference to 
pupil dilation, galvanic skin response, or changes in blood chemicals, or by 
reference to performance on some psychological test instrument after 
exposure to sample stimulus images.    
But notice the escalating Kolmogorov complexity of the category 
specification.  The messier and more uncertain the  world and the less 
access we have to reasonable theories, the longer and more detailed must be 
any purported specification of category.   Even then, a law proscribing 
PHLISA in terms of images that produce a certain blood chemical change  
in a random sample of adult males will not be adequate to ban images that 
have effects on those deviant individuals most likely  to engage in sexually 
aggressive acts.   Nor would it be possible to define PHLISA by reference to 
a random sample  of  deviants, because deviance itself has too many 
dimensions:  some may react in bizarre ways to pictures of  Minnie Mouse, 
to say nothing of Snow White.  In short,  there is no adequate theory-based 
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categorization of  "pornography" because there is no adequate theory of the 
human behaviors as to which pornography is relevant.    We can and do, of 
course, utilize arbitrary and unsupported theories.  We can also  postulate 
that the specific gravity of witches is greater than 1.0.   But many innocent 
people will drown as the result of our ill-theorized categories.158
6. Categorizing Scripts and the Function of Narrative. 
Thus far our examples entailed the categorization of objects.   But 
what of categories of the kind (!) that occupy much of the categorizing 
work of law:  first degree murder, parole agreements, hearsay evidence, and 
so on? As I explain in this section, these categories are perhaps best 
understood in the context of an extension of the "theory theory" of 
categorization, and a persistent attention to context.   
To begin with an easier case, consider the category "waiter."  At some 
food establishments (restaurants in the Sizzler chain, for example), 
customers pick up food orders from a window, but then a restaurant 
employee brings drinks and, if ordered, desert.  Are these people "waiters?"  
How do we decide?  We may have ideas about the features of a prototypical 
waiter (by dress, gender, behavior, and so on), but these features don't seem 
especially helpful  here.  And clearly each of us has access to numerous 
exemplars of "waiter."   Our concept of "waiter" only makes sense in the 
term of a stored "script" for "eating at a restaurant." A "script" is a 
stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-known situation.159
We can think of scripts as schemas for events:   the knowledge structures 
that tell us the sequence of events to expect when we enter a restaurant, as 
well as what to expect if we order a bowl of fruit.  Over time we develop 
different expectations or scripts.  We learn, for example, that in restaurants 
serving cuisines originating in Asia we are more likely to find chopsticks 
than silverware.  We learn that in restaurants in Kyoto, as in small cafes in 
rural Oklahoma, one generally pays at the cash register.  The Sizzler 
employee fits the category "waiter" to the degree that he or she matches 
that role in the prototypical script for restaurant meals.  The fit is not 
perfect (or prototypical).  As in the case of objects, context may help:  The 
158 There is, in addition, a potential problem of recursive ambiguity:  If the categories 
depend on theories, how do we describe those theories in ways that do not merely move the locus 
of ambiguity to the expression of those theories?   A full answer to this question is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but this is another area in which the tools of cognitive science, and the notion 
of parallel constraint satisfaction in connectionist networks, have been usefully brought to bear.   
See PAUL THAGARD, COMPUTATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1988).
159 ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND 
UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES (1977).
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ambiguously categorized employee might be considered a waiter for 
purposes of tipping, depending on whether our implicit theory of tipping 
concerns augmenting the income of low wage workers in such settings, or 
paying for some kind of quid pro quo in service. 
The existence in memory of scripts has significant effects for how we 
interpret and remember events.  When given a story about a situation for 
which we have a script, we are likely to falsely remember having read about
events not in the text, but supplied by the script itself.160   We tend to
reorder the sequence of events to fit the sequence supplied by the script for 
such events.161  Doctors seem to use script-like knowledge to arrive at 
diagnosis on the basis of the pattern of patient symptoms.162
The relationship between scripts and categorization is bidirectional.  
Consider the classic category of "things to take out of a burning home."  
The "theory theory" explanation of this category can be understood in 
terms of specifying those objects that fill one of the slots in a script. In this 
instance, the script enables and explains the categorization of objects.  But 
we also categorize scripts themselves.  The example just given is an 
exemplar in a category of scripts we might call "situations calling for urgent 
action to save things of value."  Much of the law is chiefly concerned with 
categories of this kind.   
Consider "lying in wait," "provocation," "undue influence" or "insider 
trading." Imagine trying to convey the import of these doctrines without
resort to stories that typify and -- together with the scores of similar (!) 
stories in literature or appellate decisions -- constitute these categories.  
Some category labels, like "good Samaritan," retain traces of the original 
story that gave rise to them.  
Although it is not clear whether the processes entailed in such 
categorization are the same as those in the categorization of objects, in part 
because scripts have dimensions -- temporal sequence and causal relations --
lacking in objects,163 it seems likely that the categorization of scripts relies 
on prototypes or accessing exemplars at the time of categorization.  In 
perhaps the leading theory of script processing, Schank and Abelson 
160 Gordon H. Bower et al., Scripts in Text Comprehension and Memory, 11 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 177 (1979).
161 Valerie Abbott et al., The Representation of Scripts in Memory, 24 J. MEMORY & 
LANGUAGE 179-199 (1985).
162 Bernard Charlin et al., Scripts and Medical Diagnostic Knowledge: Theory and 
Applications for Clinical Reasoning and Research, 75 ACAD. MED. 182 (2000).
163 Neuroimaging studies suggest that two different kinds of processing in two different 
regions of the brain are involved in processing scripts:  one devoted to the temporal sequence of 
script events and another devoted to categorizing entire scripts.  Arnaud Partiot, Brain Activation 
During Script Event Processing, 7 NEUROREPORT 761, 765 (1996).
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propose that people retain in memory "story skeletons" that serve to 
standardize particular situations,164 in effect functioning as prototypical 
scripts.
In general, the categorization of scripts, stories or narratives has been 
the subject of far less inquiry by experimental psychologists than the 
categorization of objects,165 but has drawn considerable attention from 
researchers on juror decision-making.  The leading theory of how jurors 
make decisions is the "story model" of Pennington and Hastie.  In their 
model, jurors arrive at decisions by (a) organizing evidence into story form 
(b) learning the attributes of verdict categories and (c) reaching a decision 
"through classification of the story into the best-fitting verdict 
category."166  Determining which story is "best fitting" is, of course, a 
categorization task. 
Several studies suggest that jurors rely on prototypical scripts of crime 
scenarios, but it is doubtful that there are prototypical scripts for relatively 
general categories like "first degree murder."167  Richard Weiner and his 
colleagues used cluster analysis to determine that the stories generated by 
subjects asked to imagine "first degree murder" scenarios had no less than 13 
different themes (from "battered spouse" to "murder for hire").   They 
concluded that they had found a "much more complex system of 
organization than anticipated by schema or prototype theorists."168
Perhaps more plausibly, their choice of a category at a rather high level of 
generality ("first degree murder") accounts for their failure to find a single 
associated prototypical script.  It might still be the case that the average 
juror has  prototypical scripts for less general categories, like "murder for 
hire."  
In any event, it is clear that people possess the capacity to categorize 
scripts, stories and narrative at a very high level of generality, based on 
164 Roger C. Schank & Robert P. Abelson, Knowledge and Memory:  The Real Story, in 8 
ADVANCES SOCIAL COGNITION, 1-85 (Robert S. Wyer ed., 1995).  For a more popularized 
account, see Schank's Tell Me A Story, 147-188 (1990).
165 The field of discourse psychology is chiefly concerned with the processing of narrative 
discourse, but there has been limited interaction between discourse psychologists and cognitive 
psychologists working on categorization.  See, e.g. Arthur C. Graesser et al., How Does the Mind
Construct and Represent Stories, in NARRATIVE IMPACT:  SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE 
FOUNDATIONS 229 (Melanie C. Green et al. eds., 2002). 
166 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence:  Tests of the Story Model 
for Juror Decision Making, J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 189, 190 (1992).  For a 
recent application of the story model to juror decision making in a civil context, see Jill E. 
Huntley and Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories:  Testing a Story-Mediated Model of 
Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (2003).
167 Richard L. Weiner et al., The Psychology of Telling Murder Stories:  Do We Think in 
Scripts, Exemplars or Prototypes? 20 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 119, 121 (2002).
168 Id. at 135.
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perceived similarities. Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have 
produced a compelling exposition of the role of narrative in legal 
categorization.169   They come at narrative in the tradition of scholars in 
the humanities.  They adopt an "austere definition" of narrative, as 
requiring both "a cast of human-like characters, beings capable of willing 
their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings" and 
"a plot with a beginning, a middle and an end, in which particular 
characters are involved in particular events," a plot that has several 
distinctive features..170  Amsterdam and Bruner's "austere definition" is not 
quite austere enough for my purposes.  I would argue, rather, that it 
describes a useful prototype of the categories of narrative of the kind that 
concern them, and a more general prototype, perhaps, of "especially 
interesting and compelling narratives."   While Amsterdam and Bruner 
come at narrative from the humanities, where matters of complexity and 
nuance are especially salient, for our purposes there may also be some value 
at coming at narrative from a more elemental  level, as a form and 
extension of schemas, scripts, and theory-theories of categorization.   
Amsterdam and Bruner interpret narrative as occasioned by the violation of 
expectations carried in a script.  To use their example, "you do not tell 
about a visit to the restaurant unless something not in the [restaurant] script 
occurs."171   What this suggests, however, is not that narrative has some 
different cognitive representation than scripts, but that some scripts are not 
sufficiently interesting to occasion retrieval and recounting.172
Scripts and narratives have a role in the categorization of objects as 
well.  To some extent, the "assault weapons" category falls out of narratives:  
the Stockton schoolyard shooting and other similar tragedies.  To some 
degree the legislature is saying, "We don't want THAT to happen again," 
and THAT has by now, sadly, become a script:  A deranged individual, 
often with an acute fascination with guns, acquires an arsenal that includes 
especially powerful weapons. Note that this script (or, alternatively, 
narrative) has a slot for "weapons used in mass killings."  
Whether an object is or is not an assault weapon, in the United States 
at a particular point in history, is thus to some extent socially and 
historically contingent.   One way of categorizing objects as assault weapons 
169 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 20.
170 Id. at 113.  Steven Winter offers a more complicated description of the concept of 
narrative itself as an Idealized Cognitive Model.   WINTER, supra note 133, at 106-113.
171 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 20, at 121.
172 From another perspective, narratives are to scripts as mental models are to schemas:  
particular instantiations of more general patterns.
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emerges from an understanding of the theories in physics discussed above.  
And, if legislators were functioning purely as scientists, indifferent to the 
social and political context of their actions, a theory-based approach to 
categorization might make sense.  But, of course, legislators are responding 
not merely to a cold calculus of the probability of physical injury. In a very 
real sense, legislators are responding to narrative itself:  the sensational 
stories of a handful of mass killings -- with weapons of military rather than 
hunting ancestry.  On one level -- the level of physics and the calculus of 
risk  -- it seems irrational to ban weapons largely on the basis of appearance 
while automatic shotguns can be purchased at most WalMart stores.  On 
the level at which legislators -- and law -- operate, however, there are other 
considerations that can only be understood by reference to the particular 
narratives giving rise to the legislative action.
Law aims not merely to set up predictable algorithms of punishment 
and reward, but also to communicate, to answer the protagonists in the 
narratives that animate legislative action in the first place.  If these people 
used pink shotguns or machine guns with graceful curves, then the story --
and the legislation -- would be different.  This is not to say that such 
motivations are somehow irrational.  As noted earlier, apart from the 
criminal and deranged, there is a distinct subculture in which these military 
style weapons are a salient feature.  Legislation banning weapons in this 
category communicates disapproval of the subculture as well as the 
weapons.
Whatever the motivation, legislating categories that arise primarily 
from narratives are an exceedingly challenging enterprise, for two related 
reasons.   First, there are infinitely many sequences of meaningful human 
action, even given the existence of scripts, because scripts combine in 
innumerable ways.  Second, though we have made some progress, our 
general theories of human action are in predictive and explanatory power 
vastly inferior to our theories about the natural world.  We are thus left 
with the more rudimentary means of specifying categories:  by providing 
exemplar stories and names for the similarities we perceive among them.  In 
the real world, this is work better suited to common law judges than 
legislatures.  The interpretations of judges may occasionally be corrected 
through the legislatively overruling of a judicial interpretation.173
In principle, however, a legislature might undertake the same kind of 
work engaged in by the array of appellate judges in the jurisdiction:  
considering a range of narratives, historical or hypothetical, and then 
173 See, e.g., Dan Bussel, Textualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 887 (2000) (study of legislative overrulings of Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the Bankruptcy Act).
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indicating whether or not the particular narrative conforms to the 
intended legislative category.  Of course, the real world, particularly the 
world containing active agents seeking advantages with respect to statutory 
categories, is much more variable than the worlds any set of legislators 
might imagine in advance.  But a legislature might, in effect, decide the first 
instances of statutory interpretation itself.  Although not often done in 
enacting statutes, this is precisely the method often adopted by the Internal 
Revenue Service in explaining categorical rules in the regulations 
implementing the tax code.174
7. A  Note on Categories of Categorization Theories
I have presented the three modal types of theories of categorization 
as if they were contending competitors for approval in cognitive science.  
For much of the past twenty years, that has been the case.  Each theory and 
particular variants have had strong advocates.   Experiments have been 
designed, then redesigned, to test the predictive power of one theory as 
against another.  As noted earlier, as a general model of categorization, the 
leading contender of only a few years ago, prototype theory, has lost favor.   
The most recent scholarship in these areas suggests that a common 
prototype for scientific progress – weeding out contending theories as 
against the evidence --  is in this instance wrong.   It may well be that there 
is no single theory of categorization that fully explains what all people do in 
all cases.    For example, as children learn categories, they seem to move 
from the learning of  prototypes toward theory-based categorization.    It 
appears that over the process of category learning, adults make use of 
prototypes during the early phases of learning and then move toward 
exemplar-based methods.175   Experts make categorization decisions on 
different bases than do novices.176   There are also cultural and gender 
differences in categorizations:  on average, Western Europeans are more 
likely to categorize by rule; East Asians by overall similarity.177   People 
may rely on one strategy of categorization for easy cases and another for 
hard cases.     As often happens in the case of the workings of evolution’s 
Rube Goldberg contraption that is the human brain, many things are going 
on at the same time.  As noted earlier, it appears that different strategies of 
categorization may be carried out in completely different parts of the 
174 See, for example, 26 C.F.R. §56.4911-3 regarding expenditures by nonprofits for lobbying 
and giving 12 detailed examples of the application of the rules to particular scenarios.
175 Smith &. Minda, supra note 147 and authorities therein cited. 
176 Pamela T. Hardiman et al., The Relation Between Problem Categorization and Problem 
Solving Among Experts and Novices, 17 MEMORY & COGNITION 627 (1989).
177 RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT, 144-146 (2003).
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brain.178    Finally, theory-based categorization can in the end only be as 
successful as is the underlying theory.  This does not prevent us from using 
folk theories, of course, but these tend by definition to eventually run afoul 
of how the world actually works.
8. On Domain-Theorization
I suggested above that the difficulty in categorizing was in part a 
function of how well or poorly the domains of categorization are theorized.  
It is now time to be as explicit as possible about what I mean, within the 
context of the present Article. The notion of "theorization"  is itself vague.  
Addressing that vagueness requires a minor detour into the potentially 
bottomless recursive bog of meta- theory. 
  But let us begin with simple observations:   Two carpenters arguing, 
first about carpentry and then about love.  An argument about the 
appropriate angle to cut a beam can be settled.  In very ancient times, this 
might have required the cutting of two beams and a test to see which would 
fit.  But at least since the time of Euclid, carpenters have had the ability to 
settle most such disputes with geometry, without lifting a saw.   But the 
same two carpenters will have more difficulty deciding whether a co-
worker's relationship involves real love or mere infatuation.  We have little 
difficulty agreeing that our theories of physical space are more complete 
than our theories of love.  
What it means to have a theory of something is one of the central 
problems of the philosophy of science, which is chiefly concerned with 
deciding -- at a meta-theoretical level -- what constitutes an adequate set of 
explanations:  a theory.179  An extended excursion into the philosophy of 
science is unnecessary here because our concerns are much narrower -- the 
communication of category rather than the validity of a given 
categorization.  Consider, again, a law against witchcraft, with "witch" 
being operationalized as “people who float when placed in water.”  With or 
without the ornamentation of terms like "specific gravity," such a law 
provides clear guidance to the citizenry and judges of the future.  The 
problem of legal categorization is solved, even if many other problems are 
exacerbated or ignored.
178 See sources cited supra note 131.  See also Edward E. Smith and John Jonides,  The 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Categorization, in THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 
available at http://cognet.mit.edu/Gazzaniga/Entry/chap70.html, <visited 1/28/01>
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For our purposes, then, we need a descriptive rather than a 
normative or evaluative meta-theory. Two currents within the 
contemporary philosophy  of science offer a useful point of departure. In his 
recent Science Without Laws,180 Ronald N. Giere argues that the crucial 
representations in many scientific theories are not the systems of 
propositions that concerned positivists, but rather the models scientists 
construct of aspects of the real world:
The question for a model is how well it "fits" various real-world 
systems one is trying to represent.  One can admit that no model fits 
the world perfectly in all respects while insisting that, for specified 
real-world systems, some models clearly fit better than others.  The 
better fitting models may represent more aspects of the real world or fit  
some aspects more accurately, or both.  In any case, "fit" is not simply a 
relationship between a model and the world. It requires a specification 
of which aspects of the world are important to represent and, for those 
aspects, how close a fit is desirable.181
In Giere's metatheory, theories are like maps; indeed, sometimes theories 
are maps.182  The paradigm example for Giere is the theory of plate 
tectonics in geology.  Once we have a model -- a three dimensional "map" -
- of continental plates "floating" on a viscous substrate, a great many 
previously puzzling phenomena fall into place:  the shapes of the current 
continents and why continental boundaries seem in some instances to “fit”, 
the spreading of the deep ocean floor, the patterns of magnetism trapped in 
once molten rocks, and so on.  Giere makes a reasonable case that in most 
of science it is the models that scientists create and test, rather than the 
equations and propositions that describe those models (and, only indirectly, 
the "real world"), that constitute the core of scientific theory.
From the perspective of this representationalist meta-theory, how 
fully a domain is theorized is a matter of how accurate and complete the set 
of maps and other models we possess with regard to the domain.  Because 
our maps of the familiar physical world can be extremely accurate, a statute 
referring to a physical boundary can be quite precise.  There is little doubt 
about where Arizona ends and California begins.   But imagine a legislative 
action with respect to mineral rights on a large asteroid of vaguely 
understood shape and size.  Until we have a model or map of the asteroid, 
180 RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS, (1999)
181 Id. at 92-93
182 Id. at 24-25
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any designation of a portion of the asteroid's surface will necessarily be 
quite vague.183
To continue the analogy, in the various domains of interest to 
people and legislators we have quite disparate collections of relevant maps 
and models.   Some (perhaps most of the sciences) are more like our 
modern collections of maps of the earth: fairly precise and generally 
consistent  with each other.   Others seem more like the implicit maps in 
ancient myths, referring only to distant lands and general directions.   In 
particularly ill-theorized domains (perhaps most of the humanities as well as 
those things that most deeply concern us in our personal and family lives) 
we lack the equivalent even of a single coherent ancient myth, but have 
instead have only a buzzing, blooming confusion of inconsistent tales.  
We have no certain metric by which to compare the relative
completeness and accuracy of models across domains.  But, perhaps self-
referentially, we can model collections of models.  I can tell you that the 
collections of paper and electronic maps in the UCLA library for the earth's 
surface far exceeds the collection of maps of the surface of Pluto, and that 
maps of the "surface" of Jupiter don't seem to exist because the notion of 
"surface" does not map well to that giant blob of gas.184   But how do we 
compare the set of models in geography or space science to the sets of 
models in psychology or sociology?  Reference to the quantity of volumes in 
the relevant sections of the library is unavailing.  Indeed, one of the 
hallmarks of well-theorized domains is that there is at any one time only 
one "standard model" (or at most a handful of models contending for that 
designation) that is regarded as internally coherent and substantially 
complete.  There is always contention at the margins, which may 
sometimes lead to the undoing of consensus about the "standard model," 
and the superposition of a new "paradigm". 185   But the existence of a large 
number of inconsistent contending models or theories generally marks the 
lack of a "standard model" and a less well-theorized domain.
If the sheer number of models in the domain is an unreliable guide 
to the degree of theorization, how else might we compare the relative 
theorization of disparate domains?  Another line of work in philosophy and 
the philosophy of science offers the promise of a metric:  the coherence of 
the models in the domain.  To use a seemingly vague term like coherence to 
183 In principle, we could decide how to divide the surface of an asteroid of unknown shape,
provided the asteroid is spinning.  The axis of rotation defines, potentially, an asteroidal north 
and south and the means to arrive at an equator.   From there it is but a short step to superimpose 
the notions of longitude and latitude on the asteroidal surface.
184 For the details and lovely photos, see http://pds.jpl.nasa.gov/planets/welcome/jupiter.htm 
[visited March 6, 2004].
185 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1996).
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unravel the notion of vagueness may seem a risky endeavor.  But 
recent work by the philosopher Paul Thagard and others has both brought a 
new rigor to the notion of coherence, and explained the role coherence 
plays in explanation itself.  A full exposition of these ideas is not possible 
within the constraints of this Article.  But Thagard’s idea is roughly this:  
“explanatory coherence” refers to a method of determining the acceptability 
of a proposition within a set of other propositions by examining the web of 
relations (consistency, analogy, etc.) among them, which is a kind of 
constraint satisfaction problem described in Section IV.
Notably, constraint satisfaction models of coherence and of theory 
itself accord well with the intuitions underlying the "theory-theory" of 
concepts and categories referenced in Section *, above.   For example, as 
indicated earlier, a standard example of a constraint satisfaction problem is 
a crossword puzzle, which requires imagining and testing words that meet 
the constraints that constitute the puzzle.  Quite analogously, referring to a 
category that would include "dogs, insurance policies, birds, deeds, jewelry, 
photographs, cats, bonds, children, passports" presents a similar puzzle:  
imagining instances in which such a grouping fit sensibly together.
 Thagard and Kirsten Verbeurgt have demonstrated that constraint 
satisfaction models  of coherence have certain formal mathematical 
properties.186 Assuming we can reduce the content of a theory or 
intellectual domain into a set of propositions, it is theoretically possible to 
compute the overall coherence of that theory or domain by the methods 
Thagard and Verbeurgt developed. As a practical matter, their 
formalization of coherence offers at least a consistent way of thinking about 
the relative coherence of say, quantum physics and theories of historical 
development as intellectual domains.
If this seems a stretch for our judiciary, it is important to note that 
courts are not unfamiliar with the problem of assessing the degree of 
coherence within an intellectual domain.   This is essentially the 
assessment that a court must make in determining whether proffered expert 
evidence should be admitted at trial.  Under the Daubert187 standard, 
federal judges are tasked with assessing “whether the reasoning or 
methodology underlying the [proffered expert] testimony is scientifically188
186 Paul Thagard & Karsten Verbeurgt, Coherence as Constraint Satisfaction," 22 
COGNITIVE SCI. 1 (1998).
187 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
188 Id. at 592-93.  The Daubert factors may be applied to non-scientific expert testimony as 
well. not merely that offered by scientists.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to 
the facts in issue.”189
The Supreme Court indicated that judges must evaluate such factors as (1) 
“whether a theory or technique . . . . can be (and has been) tested,”190 (2) 
“whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and 
publication,”(3) “the known or  potential rate of error,” and (4) “the degree 
to which the theory is widely accepted” within the relevant community.  
The explicit Daubert factors do not explicitly take account of the location 
of the proffered evidence within a coherent set of theories and concepts, 
but each of the Daubert factors is an indirect measure of the degree of 
coherence in the domain, for the following reasons:  (1) Validity.
Although anti-foundationalist philosophers of science would disagree with 
the formulation of scientific validity adopted by the court, most would agree 
that potential theories and propositions should be and are assessed with 
regard to their coherence with the data and with other provisionally 
accepted propositions. (2) Peer review and publication. The case here is a 
bit weaker, given that what gets published in the journals of some 
disciplines appears largely a matter of fashion and the trends of the time. 
Nevertheless, the converse is generally true:  articles that are completely 
incoherent with the prevailing fashions and paradigms have little chance of 
publication – except in disciplines where novelty is valued for its own sake.  
(3)  Error rates.  The only way to arrive at error rates is to compare observed 
values with some standard and to compute the 
consistency/correlation/coherence between the two.  (4)  Acceptance.  The 
paradigm prevailing at any time (Kuhn’s “textbook science,” or what is 
referred to as “the standard model”) is prevailing precisely because of the 
way in which it coheres with observations and other theories. Indeed, Paul 
Thagard’s constraint satisfaction models of coherence have been used to 
model closely the kinds of paradigm shifts that Kuhn described.191
189 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.  As the Court made clear later in Kumho, the Daubert 
factors are not exhaustive or meant to be applied mechanically, trial judges retaining considerable 
discretion in how to determine the question of reliability.   Justice Scalia's concurrence in Kumho 
observes that this "… is not discretion to perform the function inadequately.   Rather, it is 
discretion to choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that 
is junky."  Id. at 159.  Apparently trial judges are equipped to discern the plain meaning of "fausse" 
and "junky."
190 Id. at 593.  Notably, the Supreme Court relied on the philosophy of science of Carl 
Hempel and Karl Popper, the leading positivists who now probably represent only a significant 
minority view among philosophers of science.  Ibid.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s own reliance on 
experts in the philosophy of science fails at the level of metatheory the test it adopts at the level 
of theory.  
191 PAUL THAGARD, CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS (1992).
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A judge assessing the vagueness or precision of a statute has, 
of course, a quite different task than a judge assessing the validity of 
potential expert testimony.  First, there is the matter of time.  A judge 
ruling on the expert validity question is concerned with the state of 
knowledge in the domain at the present time.  A judge assessing how a 
legislature might have been more precise must assess the state of knowledge 
at the time the statute was adopted.  Moreover, the questions concerning 
expert testimony are generally more narrowly framed, in terms of the 
proposition to which a expert proposes to testify.   Statutes, on the other 
hand, can seek to regulate quite broadly, in ways that touch on the 
potential validity of thousands of propositions.   These differences are, 
however, differences in the magnitude of the required judicial enterprise 
rather than its possibility.
VI. IMPLICATIONS/CONCLUSIONS
How might legislators, judges and legal scholars take account of what 
science has learned about categorization?   First, assuming that it matters 
what legislators mean to say, then a reasonable pragmatic goal of bringing 
cognitive science to law is the reduction of interpretive errors, at least when
it comes to specifying legislative categories.  This is not to say that 
legislatures may always prefer precision.192  One of the possible benefits  of 
the kind of analysis sketched above is greater clarity about the costs and 
benefits of specifying categories to varying degrees of precision.  And, where 
precision is indeed the aim, the cognitive science sketched here suggests 
some means of better achieving it.
Second, by attending closely to the contexts and domains in which 
law operates, we may enrich the jurisprudence of legislative interpretation.  
In particular, whereas much jurisprudential energy has been dissipated in 
debates about the desirability and consequences of various generalized 
approaches to interpretation,  the science of human understanding and 
communication of categories suggests that the search for universal 
principles of interpretation is likely to fail, and that it must generally attend 
to the specific substantive domains in which law operates.   It is one thing 
for Justice Scalia to insist on a degree of reasonable precision in a fully 
theorized domain in which such precision can be achieved at low cost.  But 
to insist on a similar level of  precision in domains that are less fully 
understood is merely to deny the legislature the power to effectively act at 
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all in these areas.  In addition, the relatively new cognitive science of 
categorization may affect old debates about the forms of law, particularly 
ancient debates about the relative merits of "rules vs. standards."  Here 
again, cognitive science suggests  that context and communicative content 
matter in ways that these debates have long ignored.
A. Better Legislative Categorizations Through Science?
I began this study as a kind of extended thought experiment:  would it 
make a difference if legislators and judges knew some of what cognitive 
science now knows about categorization.  The most reasonable answer is 
probably,  perhaps, a little.  Certainly the science of categorization has no 
direct prescriptions for legislators.  Indeed, the fact that several theories still 
contend for universal acceptance is enough to give us pause.  As a 
pragmatic matter, however, the existence of these contending theories --
each of them with some empirical support -- may suggest how best to take 
account of them:   use them all.   As applied to many of the situations we 
encounter in life, all of the major theories appear to have some validity.  
Indeed, experimental psychologists spend a good deal of energy trying to 
devise experimental situations in which one theory will survive and the 
others will fail.   This suggests that pragmatists in law ought to borrow 
another idea from the methodologists in social science (who adapted it from 
navigators):  triangulation.   
Whether in navigation or social science, triangulation is another 
variant of the constraint satisfaction problem discussed in Section IV:  
using multiple methods to measure the same feature or phenomenon.193
The navigator feels more certain of his location when plots from different 
landmarks intersect very near the same point.  The social scientist is more 
confident of conclusions supported by cross-sectional surveys, interviews, 
and the close observation of behavior.  We also use triangulation or 
constraint satisfaction techniques to improve accuracy in communication.  
The reason that sailors, pilots and others refer in radio communications to 
letters of the alphabet as Alpha, Baker, Charlie and so on, is that these 
words carry information that constrains interpretation of their initial 
letters.   
193 See, e.g., NIGEL G. FIELDING & JANE L. FIELDING, LINKING DATA (1986); 
Norman K. Denzin  Strategies of Multiple Triangulation, in THE RESEARCH ACT: A 
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS 234-247 (3rd ed. 
1989); Todd Jick, Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Practice,  24 
ADMIN. SCI. Q., 602 (1979).  
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Applying these principles to legislation, a legislature keen on 
constraining the possible misinterpretations of categorical content might 
consider proceeding as described below.  Let me concede at the outset that 
some of these methods of legal categorization will strike readers as bizarre 
and unthinkable.  For now, consider the following merely as a thought 
experiment about how a legislative specification of "assault weapons" could 
be made maximally precise:
1.  Utilize a theory, partial or complete,  underlying the category, if 
there is one.  For example:   "The purpose of this legislation is to limit the 
availability of weapons of great lethality that are not generally used for 
hunting purposes.  Accordingly, the first component of the category 
definition of 'assault weapons' is 'firearms capable of firing more than 100 
rounds per minute with more than 100 foot pounds of muzzle energy, 
excepting only shotguns holding 6 or fewer shells in the magazine'".
2.  Identify the prototype that best fits the category.  For example:  
"The prototype of the weapons we intend to regulate is the AK-47."
3.  Exemplars and Near-Miss Non-Exemplars with "typicality" or 
"category gradient of membership" judgments of  legislators, expressed in 
numeric form.  For example:  "By the vote reflected in Column A below, we 
mean to include the weapon in Column B.  By the vote reflected in 
Column D we mean to exclude the weapon in Column C.”
A B C D
98:3  AK-47   Ruger 10-22    4:96
90:10  UZI   Model 12 Win.   12:88
68:32  BAR   Remington 870   33:67
4.     A trained neural network or other classifier system.   For example, 
the array of features (caliber, firing rate, barrel length, and so on) of each 
weapon in an entire current catalog of small arms could be included in the 
"training set" of a neural network.  "Training" would be provided by 
providing feedback on categorization by means of votes like those reflected 
above.  The nonlinear patterns present in what "assault weapons" appears to 
mean to legislators would be learned by the network, which would 
thereafter classify new candidate weapons.
5.  Assess the costs of doing each of the foregoing, the possible benefits 
of both precision and imprecision, and send along an accompanying 
message that indicates the results of the decisions and preferences for how 
issues of underinclusion and overinclusion should be resolved.  In weighing 
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those risks, the legislature might want to make use of the "Receiver 
Operating Characteristic" framework described in Section IV. The 
legislature may not be able to calculate or specify such a curve, but the very 
framework focuses attention on the tradeoffs between overinclusion and 
underinclusion.  The resulting statute might merely be accompanied, as part 
of the legislative history, with an explicit statement on the issue, something 
like:  "Given the limited amount of time available to specifying the 
category of "assault weapons," we have elected to utilize only methods 1 and 
2 for specifying the category of "assault weapons."  Given our assessment of 
the relative costs and benefits to society of not including particularly 
dangerous weapons, in comparison to the costs and benefits of including 
weapons that are less dangerous and more utilized for sporting purposes, it is 
our intention that all reasonable uncertainties be resolved in favor of 
including firearms within the category."194   One can even imagine using 
similar methods of exposition in describing the categories,  say, of 
"acceptable overinclusion" and "unacceptable overinclusion."
There is certainly good reason to suggest that legislators ought to adopt 
theory-based legislation when they have the means to do so, and that there 
may be some value as well in adopting the other methods suggested above.   
But the notion that a real-world legislature will spend time taking votes on 
individual weapons for the purposes of instructing a neural network seems
preposterous.  Perhaps.  But consider that other legislatures, including the 
Congress of the United States, have adopted legislation containing 
extensive lists of weapons. It is doubtless true that few legislators inspected 
this list before voting on it, but that is an issue of appropriate delegation 
and procedure for the legislature to determine.
Certainly,  one can imagine areas of legislation in which the stakes are 
sufficiently high that a rational legislature might want to expend enormous 
effort in categorizing situations in advance of rule-application to particular 
instances.   For example, under a Constitution adopted in a world in which 
events moved at a less rapid pace, the Congress of the United States 
effectively possessed the exclusive power to declare war.   Yet the strategic 
forces of the United States are now poised to deliver an unimaginable level 
of death and destruction in a matter of minutes, upon the rapid 
classification by the President alone of a set of circumstances as one 
requiring that response, in accordance with the strategic defense policy of 
the United States.  Congress has effectively delegated this power, surely 
194 Whether inserting such an interpretive rule into a statute is constitutionally permissible 
is an interesting topic outside the scope of this article.  See, generally, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV 2085 (2002).
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more awesome than that entailed in any previous declaration of war, 
out of felt necessity.  It is not unthinkable, however, that Congress might 
adopt a different approach, one that would provide more guidance to the 
military and executive and yet allow for rapid reaction to complex 
circumstances.   Some of the methods suggested here, including the neural 
network trained on combinations of scenarios by Congress, would permit 
just such a rapid calculation of likely Congressional intent, not as a 
replacement for executive decision making, but as an aid to it.195
B. Implications for Theories of Statutory Interpretation.
Perhaps the principal value of engaging in these thought experiments is 
not to suggest practical means by which legislatures can enact more precise 
statutory categories, but rather to suggest to those who interpret statutes a 
framework for taking account of the context of the substantive domain in 
which legislation operates.   Debates about statutory interpretation tend to be 
couched in general terms about "the law," illuminated by particular 
examples chosen to buttress the arguments for the approach to statutory 
interpretation being advanced.  To be sure, there are advocates for 
"contextualism" of various forms.  Of the coherent approaches to 
interpretation -- recently characterized as the "old war-horses of 
interpretation:  textualism, literalism, plain meaning, original intent, 
purpose, contextualism, canons of construction, pre- and post-enactment 
legislative history, imaginative reconstruction, counter-majoritarianism, 
statutory stare decisis, and dynamic interpretation"196 -- only the most 
extreme versions of the first four would deny the relevance of some form of 
context.  Modern textualists recognize that the meaning of a statute, like the 
meaning of any other text, can only be decoded "according to the common 
social and linguistic conventions shared by the relevant community".197
Contextualists vary considerably in what other aspects of context should 
matter.  Those characterized by John Manning as "strong purposivists" 
would have judges attend to a “statute’s overall tenor,” including the 
historical context when the statute was passed, society’s values, patterns of 
policy for related statutes, and statements in the legislative history.198  For 
William Eskridge, the relevant contexts are social and political, and context 
196 Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and
Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (1991) 
197 John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 
(2001).
198 Id. at 10-11.
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itself thus evolves:  "[T]he meaning of a statute will change as social context 
changes, as new interpreters grapple with the statute, and as the political 
context changes. . . ."199  Pierre Schlag would include a vast "web" of 
interrelated contexts, even in interpreting so seemingly simple a statute as 
the classic prohibition of  "vehicles in the park":
That is because, as a general word in a legal rule, the term 
draws its meaning from the interweavings of all manner of webs -
webs that are often described as linguistic, cognitive, moral, 
political, institutional, or cultural. In the rule, the meaning of the 
term "vehicle" is inscribed in tacit understandings of parks; legal 
rules; the effects of legal rules; the roles and possibilities of legal 
rules within the hierarchies of sources of law; the "public" meaning 
of legal rules for citizens and public officials; and the meaning of 
legal rules in light of juridical concepts of excuse, justification, 
prosecutorial discretion, and much more. We are not just talking 
about parks and vehicles here; we are talking about parks and 
vehicles in a legal rule in a legal system in a particular culture."200
Understandably, some scholars and judges are troubled by the potential 
malleability of interpretation seemingly so loosely constrained by "context" 
so variously described.  The reaction, most often associated with Justice 
Scalia, seeks to eliminate considerations of nonlinguistic context to the 
maximum extent possible.  
As a general matter, we may share Justice Scalia's instinct that strict 
adherence to the texts of law will encourage legislators over time to be more 
attentive to the laws they write,  with a resulting increase in rule precision.  
We may share Justice Scalia's distaste for legislation that confers so much 
discretion on judges that they feel relatively unconstrained in applying their 
own preferences.   But to insist on an arbitrarily high degree of rule 
precision or categorical specificity in poorly theorized domains, without 
reference to the possibility of precision, is to deny the possibility of law in 
these domains, with far more inhibiting effects than either due process or 
separation of powers doctrine requires.  Moreover, even where great 
precision is possible, it is never costless, requiring legislators to determine 
how to allocate the scarce resources of their time and attention.  Democratic 
theory suggests that making such a determination should not be left, in the 
first instance, to judges.  
199 ESKRIDGE, supra note 35, at 199.
200 Pierre Schlag, No Vehicles in the Park, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 381, 387 (1999).
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Like the interpretive stances to which it is a reaction, 
textualism advances a generalized, universal approach to interpretation. As 
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule observe, 
[t]ypically, interpretive issues are debated at a high level of 
abstraction, by asking questions about the nature of interpretation, 
or by making large claims about democracy, legitimacy, authority, 
and constitutionalism.  But most of the time, large-scale claims of 
these kinds cannot rule out any reasonable view about 
interpretation.
Sunstein and Vermeule would replace the misguided search for universal 
"first best" principles of interpretation with a contextual analysis sensitive to 
the institutional capacities of legislatures, agencies and courts, as well as to 
the dynamic effects of particular approaches of both private and public 
actors.  In one sense, this is but another form of contextualism, adding 
another entry to Schlag's catalog of contexts.  But it is more than that, 
because it springs from the insight that the choice of interpretive rules must 
itself be sensitive to context.  
I share with Sunstein and Vermeule a skepticism about the 
feasibility of any generalized abstract approach to statutory interpretation.  
But I would add to their insistence on an attention to institutional and 
dynamic concerns, the requirement that a sound approach to statutory 
interpretation be sensitive as well to both the possibility and the costs of 
statutory precision at the time of drafting, recognizing that these will vary 
dramatically across substantive domains, for all the reasons I have 
cataloged.   The feasibility and costs of precision will vary even within the 
same institutional arrangements and over time, as the domain of legislation 
becomes more adequately theorized and the costs of precision therefore 
decline.  These factors do not necessarily lend support to either textualism or 
any variant of contextualism, but rather add essential dimension to 
considerations of either.   
In other words, there is merit to the argument that the rule of law is 
well served over time if judges hold legislation to an appropriately high 
standard of precision.  What is appropriate will depend on many things; 
among them are the possibilities and costs of  precision, as a consequence of 
the level of theorization of the relevant domains.  In reviewing legislation a 
court might consider, in addition to the other factors elaborated earlier, the 
following:  First, were there in existence plausible theories that would 
enable greater rule precision?  Second, did the legislature consider the 
relative costs and benefits of the form of law it selected, given the state of 
knowledge in the domain?  Third, was the legislature's choice of form of 
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law, given both the range of possibilities and costs and benefits, arbitrary or 
irrational, or violative of some other standard?  Such a contextual approach 
is preferable to trying to apply a generalized rule to rules, or holding
standards to an a priori standard.   Such an analysis does not end questions 
of interpretation or fundamental jurisprudence, including how much 
deference judges should give to the decisions of legislators about how to 
enact law.  But the science reviewed in this article provides some means for 
framing those questions with more precision.
C. Beyond Statutes.
Although this Article has focused on problems of categorizing and 
communication in the context of statutes, some of the approaches described 
here are potentially applicable to a far wider range of issues in law and legal 
scholarship.   The problem of categorizing possible objects or situations ex 
ante is pervasive throughout law.   Parties to a contract must consider how 
to describe what will constitute material breach of the contract, and 
negotiate their intentions into words to be later interpreted not only by 
themselves, but by a judge or arbitrator.  A trustor or testator must consider 
how to describe those situations that will remove a contingency 50 years 
hence, as the result of an interpretive act by a trustee or judge.   All law, 
not merely statutory law, exists in time.  Much of the same science, and the 
same technologies for precision I have suggested for consideration in 
statutory drafting, may also be of some use whenever the most generic 
problem in law arises: how shall we best say what we mean, when what we 
mean has consequences, and our words are to be interpreted in the future?
